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Software industry in Argentina I 
Summary 
The use of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) entails comprehensive and far-
reaching impacts in large areas of economy and 
society. For developing countries, too, these tech-
nologies offer new potentials for accessing stocks 
of knowledge dispersed throughout the world, 
overcoming traditional barriers to development, 
and accelerating catch-up processes. This, how-
ever, presupposes that the technical conditions 
and the infrastructure are in place that are required 
for any comprehensive use of ICT. Furthermore, 
the use of ICT as a catalyst of development pro-
cesses cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
technological competence available in situ. The 
potentially efficient users of technologies with 
very short life cycles must be conversant with 
their specific technological state of the art or at 
least have recourse to relevant advisory or con-
sulting services. In the field of information tech-
nology (IT) the search for internationally available 
software suited to solving specific problems as 
well as the implementation, installation, and main-
tenance of such software call for a high level of 
technological competence. Many international 
program packages are not designed to solve local 
problems, and the necessary adaptations require a 
high level of technical competence. In the absence 
of such competence such services must be ren-
dered by international providers or consulting 
companies, and this can mean prohibitive costs for 
many potential users in developing countries, 
leading to restrictions on the spatial and social 
scope of possible technological innovations. The 
advanced developing countries would also be well 
advised not to leave the world market for software 
entirely to the industrialized countries and instead 
to seek to actively participate in it by offering 
products and services in demand there. 
The present study, based on the example of Ar-
gentina, looks into issues touching on the condi-
tions that must be given in developing countries if 
they are to develop technological competence in 
IT and specifically in software development as 
well as into the policy measures that governments 
can use to support this development and the con-
tributions that can be provided by international 
development cooperation. Between February and 
April 2000 the authors of the present study con-
ducted comprehensive interviews designed to cast 
light on these issues. The authors surveyed 58 com-
panies involved chiefly in developing and market-
ing software in Argentina. In addition, 43 Argen-
tine companies from three selected branches of 
industry were interviewed to gain an estimate of 
the extent to which and the form in which soft-
ware is used in modernizing Argentine businesses. 
The company surveys were supplemented by in-
terviews with experts from the private sector, the 
field of science, and public-sector institutions. 
The problem's relevance to development 
Building technological competence in IT and de-
veloping a relevant range of products and services 
in developing countries are issues that have thus 
far found little resonance in the discussion on 
development policy and in the deployment of 
suitable measures. It would, however, be time to 
start, in view of the fact that one of the contribu-
tions expected of development policy is to help 
build self-sustaining economic structures than 
lead, via growth and employment, to a sustainable 
reduction of poverty. Basing our considerations 
on this widened concept of development, we can 
point to the following arguments in favor of pro-
moting the development of technological compe-
tence in IT: 
— Under the conditions of increasingly open 
economies, it is only thoroughgoing moderni-
zation, including the use of IT, that can en-
sure the competitiveness of companies in de-
veloping countries, in this way sustainably 
securing jobs in the formal sector. 
— Technological competence is only in part a 
tradable good. The exclusive use of imported 
products and services leads to costs prohibi-
tive to many small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) and other potential users in de-
veloping countries and thus diminishes the 
social and spatial impacts of the use of IT. 
— The production and provision of IT services 
is highly employment-intensive. In develop-
ing a range of products of their own, such 
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companies create valuable jobs in forward-
looking service fields that can give rise to ex-
tensive multiplier effects. 
— The world market for software and IT ser-
vices has been growing at two-digit rates for 
many years now, and there are no signs that 
the market will soon be saturated. For devel-
oping countries this can mean possibilities to 
develop exports, acquire orders, and attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI), in this way 
joining in the international division of labor. 
The main task facing government would be to use 
targeted social inputs to offset the possibility of 
market failure. Without government activity over-
all investments in education and training tend to 
fall short of the socially desirable level. The rea-
son for this is that only part of the returns on pri-
vate investments in qualification measures flow 
back to investors. Moreover, investment in re-
search and development (R&D) generates exter-
nalities that mean positive effects for an econ-
omy's competitiveness. The industrialized coun-
tries have a broad range of experience in design-
ing and shaping technology institutions and in-
struments. They can support the efforts develop-
ing countries are making to enhance their techno-
logical competence by transferring their experi-
ence in this field. 
The present study's conceptual context 
There is at present no theoretically grounded con-
cept indicating how and under what conditions 
developing countries could close the gap on the 
industrialized countries in the field of IT. For this 
reason the study looks back to some thoughts 
developed by Sanjaya Lall at the beginning of the 
1990s. Building on experiences made in the field 
of latecomer industrialization, Sanjaya Lall identi-
fies some influencing factors crucial to the devel-
opment of technological competence. He stresses 
the interplay between competent and learning 
companies, functioning factor markets, adequate 
institutional arrangements, and incentives with a 
stimulative effect on technological development. 
The starting point and de facto source of technolo-
gical innovation processes is the innovative and 
competent enterprise. The development of com-
pany-specific technological competence ("firm-
level technological capabilities") rests mainly on 
three factors, viz. the ability of a company to 
— assess investments in technological develop-
ment ("investment capabilities"); 
— to master, assimilate, imitate, or improve 
existing process and product technologies, or 
to develop them autonomously ("production 
capabilities"); 
— to build linkages to other actors such as cus-
tomers, suppliers, associated service compa-
nies, and research institutions ("linkage capa-
bilities"). 
It is not in isolation but together with other eco-
nomic, scientific, and governmental actors that 
companies develop technological competence. 
While it is true that each individual company op-
erates its own technology and innovation man-
agement, this management is subject to a "com-
mon element of response of firms to the policy, 
market and institutional framework." The shape 
given to a specific framework of this kind brings 
about different national levels of technological 
competence, and these in turn entail different rates 
of productivity and growth. Sanjaya Lall terms 
this "national-level technological capabilities" 
(NTC). A broadly effective increase in techno-
logical competence will only materialize if a suf-
ficiently large number of companies is prepared to 
invest in technological progress. And the key to 
such progress is specific incentives designed to 
act on the business environment; they break down 
into three groups: 
— Macroeconomic incentives, such as growth, 
inflation, interest and exchange rates as well 
as the availability of foreign exchange and 
credit. 
— Particularly effective are incentives provided 
by the internal and external competition to 
which a company is exposed. 
— Factor markets can have positive effects on 
technological development if they are flexi-
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ble, reflect factor prices in line with the mar-
ket, and lead to an efficient allocation of re-
sources. 
A company's factor endowment has an influence 
on the extent to which it will be able to use, adapt, 
and develop technology for the market. Since the 
individual company is for the most part unable to 
generate the factors of production it needs on its 
own, it has to demand them in the relevant factor 
markets. According to Lall, there are three types 
of factor endowment that are relevant in this con-
nection: 
— Access to sufficient financial capital is the 
sine qua non to investment in technological 
capabilities. And if capital is to be deployed as 
efficiently as possible, an economy must have 
a functioning financial system. 
— A sufficient number of adequately trained 
workers must be available. Although qualifi-
cations can also be acquired informally and 
by way of practical experience, a central role 
has to be played by formal training, for the 
most part closely associated with public edu-
cation. 
— Access to technological information provides 
support for company-level innovation efforts. 
This information is generated through R&D 
conducted in companies and research institu-
tions and has to be complemented through 
access to internationally available informa-
tion. 
Institutions define the framework for the inter-
play between factor endowment and incentives, 
for instance in the form of intellectual property 
rights. The development of technological compe-
tence can furthermore be encouraged via techno-
logical training, publicly funded research, and 
institutions dedicated to technology transfer and 
the promotion of business startups. 
There are two arguments indicating that, despite 
increasing globalization, the national frame of 
reference is crucial for the development of techno-
logical competence: 
— The factor markets important for companies 
to enhance their technological competence 
are mainly organized at the national or subna-
tional level, and their functioning often de-
pends on government decisions. 
— Close interaction between producers and users 
plays a key role in developing and dissemi-
nating technological innovations. These user-
producer relations are encouraged by spatial 
proximity and linguistic and cultural affini-
ties. 
Argentina - a potential location for techno-
logically demanding software production? 
Argentina, a newly industrializing country (NIC), 
is practically unknown as a provider of techno-
logically demanding products and services. Its 
role in the international division of labor has until 
now mainly consisted in exporting bulk agricul-
tural and agroindustrial goods and importing the 
knowledge-intensive products it needs. Proceed-
ing on the basis of Lall's concept, we must assess 
the conditions for a catch up process in techno-
logical competence as unfavorable. 
We find some severe deficits at the microlevel. 
The country's enterprise structure is marked by a 
dual structure: a core of some 500 highly produc-
tive, technologically competent, and export-ori-
ented corporations on the one side and roughly 
890 000 SMEs, only a few of which can produce 
to international quality standards, on the other. 
The Argentine private sector's propensity for tech-
nological innovation is low, user-producer interac-
tion is weak. 
While companies that want to boost their competi-
tiveness by means of technological innovation can 
find qualified personnel in the Argentine labor 
market, funding poses substantial problems. Ac-
cess to the relevant information is limited in that 
public investment in science and technology is 
relatively low and the relevant institutions are for 
the most part not properly interlinked with the 
private sector. The incentives emanating from the 
business environment are ambiguous: though Ar-
gentine companies in some years achieve high 
IV Andreas Stamm 
 
growth rates, the country is far from any stable 
economic dynamics. In the 1990s the country did 
succeed in stabilizing prices, but this success was 
bought at the expense of an overvalued currency 
and high real interest rates. 
Argentina's software sector: its structure 
and dynamics 
When the present study was in preparation, there 
were hardly any reliable figures available on Ar-
gentina's providers of software and IT services. It 
was estimated for 1995 that some 300 national 
and international companies were producing and 
marketing software in Argentina. Since then a 
good number of suppliers have been forced out of 
the market. At the same time, quite a few new 
companies have been started up, and so we may 
assume that even today the figure of 300 national 
software companies is close to reality. The em-
pirical data of the present study indicate that in 
1999 the sales revenues of national software pro-
viders were around US $ 300 million and that 
these firms directly and regularly employed some 
4500 persons. Our estimate is that the exports of 
Argentine software companies do not exceed 
US $ 25 million. 
The industry consists for the most part of rela-
tively new companies. Half of the companies sur-
veyed were started up in the 1990s. The great 
majority of software companies were founded by 
university graduates who had majored in IT or 
related disciplines. The interviews conducted 
permit us to infer an ideal-typical course for the 
development of a great deal of new companies. 
Many company founders started out, themselves 
or in small teams, providing programming ser-
vices for individual customers. These are for the 
most part SMEs that began to introduce IT in the 
mid-1990s, when hardware prices began to tum-
ble. These programming jobs served to computer-
ize certain functions in company administration 
and management. Successful provision of a soft-
ware solution often led to follow-up jobs for other 
companies. Reuse of individual modules made it 
more and more possible for developers to go be-
yond individual contracts and begin to produce 
partially or completely standardized products, to 
lower costs, and to build stocks of customers. 
Even today, enterprise-resource planning (ERP) 
software constitutes the most important segment 
of the programs offered by Argentine companies. 
SMEs from the secondary or tertiary sectors are 
their most important clientele. Public institutions 
(hospitals, municipal administrations) need soft-
ware to computerize administrative operations. 
Some providers have concentrated on computer-
ized solutions for professionals and freelancers 
(doctors, lawyers, insurance representatives). 
In terms of program complexity and price, the 
ERP software on the market presents a highly 
differentiated picture. It ranges from simple, fully 
standardized packages for small enterprises to 
complex solutions for mid-sized companies, that 
contain, on top of partially standardized software, 
comprehensive advisory and implementation ser-
vices. The business strategies pursued in this con-
nection are correspondingly broad in nature. The 
suppliers of standard packages often market their 
product via middlemen or other IT service provid-
ers who also take charge of installation as well as 
the maintenance and service of the programs. The 
number of customers is high, some 30 000 li-
censes have already been sold for the best-selling 
Argentine ERP program. The providers of com-
plex IT solutions, on the other hand, have direct 
contact to only a limited number of customers, for 
whom they take on comprehensive jobs. 
There are only a few companies active outside the 
ERP segment, for instance a provider of geo-
graphic information systems or a company that 
offers a complex program for architects. Some 
companies offer computerized solutions for tech-
nical problems. These are provided with cus-
tomer-specific programming or in the form of 
partially standardized program packages with high 
service requirements. Two suppliers from our 
sample are involved in developing so-called em-
bedded software. This is software that is inte-
grated into technical systems and equipment. 
Argentine software providers have until now 
mainly serviced the domestic market. Fourteen 
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companies (24 %) also had customers abroad, 
mainly in MERCOSUR countries. Their volume 
of exports is relatively small, though. Only eight 
companies (14 %) export more than 10 % of their 
sales volume, and only two companies transact 
over half of their business abroad. Export suc-
cesses are reported almost exclusively by compa-
nies active outside the segment of ERP software. 
Most of the companies interviewed are small. At 
the end of 1999 only eight companies from the 
sample (14 %) employed more than 50 persons, 
the largest had 120 employees. The average num-
ber of persons employed by the companies sur-
veyed was 24, the median 15. Depending on their 
volume of orders, many companies hire extra 
staff, often students or freelancers, on the basis of 
short-term service contracts. The overall sample 
shows a close correlation between sales volume 
and number of employees. This means that very 
few effects to scale are achieved in the Argentine 
software industry; the data we collected indicate 
that Argentine software companies create one new 
job for every increase in sales of roughly US $ 
40 000. Approximately half of the jobs in the 
companies interviewed were held by university 
graduates. Sixty-two percent of these persons held 
degrees in computer sciences or systems engineer-
ing. In addition, many such employees had at-
tended a three-to four-year technical computer-
science training program. 
Most of the companies concerned had developed 
positively in the years prior to the survey, i.e. their 
sales, employment, and numbers of customers had 
risen. At the same time, however, both the internal 
and the external competition to which these com-
panies are exposed had intensified. An exact 
analysis of our data permits the following inter-
pretation: 
— The protective "natural niche" from which, 
thanks to national peculiarities, the Argentine 
providers of ERP software were long able to 
benefit, has been penetrated by international 
providers in subsegments. 
— Companies that offer technologically de-
manding specialized products or software that 
needs to be tailored specifically from cus-
tomer to customer continue to face very lim-
ited international competition. 
The role of software in the modernization 
of Argentine companies 
The empirical study included an analysis of the 
role of software in the modernization of Argentine 
companies in the auto parts industry, in the wine-
making business, and in logistics. Most of the 
companies interviewed in these branches of indus-
try were comparatively large SMEs; the study 
was, though, not concerned with presenting a rep-
resentative picture of the overall industries con-
cerned. 
For some time now the Argentine auto parts in-
dustry has been faced with tough international 
competition, specially following the devaluation 
of the Brazilian Real in 1999. This competition 
and the pressure exerted by assembly plants are 
forcing these companies, for the most part me-
dium in size, to accelerate their processes of mod-
ernization. This inevitably means the use of soft-
ware, though investments for software are subor-
dinate to those made for plant and machinery. 
Most of the programs used in production are pur-
chased from international suppliers and are as a 
rule software embedded in machinery. As far as 
ERP is concerned, we found clear-cut differences 
associated with the origin of companies' majority 
shareholders. Argentine companies for the most 
part demand national software that has been 
adapted to local conditions. Companies dominated 
by foreign capital, on the other hand, mainly pur-
chase their software in the international market. In 
many companies the parent corporation deter-
mines what software to use, since it is interested 
in networking its branches using a uniform sys-
tem. Other international corporations have their 
own ICT departments that develop dedicated sys-
tems for the specific needs of the company. 
The companies surveyed are at times unable to 
find adequate solutions for certain problems in the 
Argentine market. For instance, they see a lack of 
software for technical applications (design and 
metrology) as well as of systems adequate to the 
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task of integral corporate management, that is, 
systems that interlink production and administra-
tion. The latter programs are available in the in-
ternational market, though they do not pay for 
themselves in the narrow domestic market and are 
thus beyond the financial means of SMEs in par-
ticular. 
The winemaking industry 
Argentina's traditionally domestically oriented 
winemaking industry is increasing looking to ex-
ports, with simple table wines being replaced by 
higher-grade quality wines. These processes are 
bound up with technical modernization. This calls 
first and foremost for investment in plant and 
equipment (filter presses, high-grade steel tanks), 
and the investments needed for software are rela-
tively small. 
The advances made in computerizing winemaking 
companies differ in extent between production on 
the one hand and administrative and commercial 
departments on the other. With the exception of 
embedded software, used for instance to monitor 
tank temperatures, actual wine production has not 
found many uses for IT. One exception is a pro-
gram used to document the receipt of grapes and 
prepare a mandatory legal declaration required by 
the national winegrowing institute. 
All of the companies interviewed use ERP soft-
ware. Many winemaking estates have a marketing 
office in Buenos Aires that makes extensive use of 
IT, though the software for the most part does not 
link them with their remote production operations. 
Some such companies use their own ICT depart-
ments to produce the ERP software they need, 
though most of them purchase from national pro-
viders of generic ERP-programs, software that has 
not been developed specifically with the wine-
making industry in mind. 
Logistics services 
Logistics services are a relatively recent business 
segment in Argentina; core competences include 
the handling of large quantities of information. 
With the exception of tiny operations, all of the 
logistics companies interviewed use software for 
different company functions, and most of them 
have an ICT department of their own. As far as 
the company functions radically modernized in 
recent years are concerned, these companies pre-
fer in-house developments and international pro-
grams. Software supplied by Argentine providers 
is used mainly for accounting, personnel man-
agement, as well as for some special applications 
(programs to optimize route-planning). 
It is above all a lack of specific solutions that pre-
vents any closer cooperation between national 
software providers and logistics companies. Sev-
eral of the companies surveyed reported that they 
are unable to find software solutions for their core 
business (warehousing) in the national market. 
The companies interviewed stated that the rele-
vant modules of ERP programs are not suited to 
the purpose, since they lack the required degree of 
complexity. At the same time international sys-
tems are too costly for Argentine logistics opera-
tions. Due to these problems on the supply side 
many companies are forced to program their own 
software, which they combine with other modules 
purchased in the market. 
The software industry's strengths, weak-
nesses, and future risks and chances 
The Argentine software industry has thus far de-
veloped mainly in response to domestic demand. 
This entails specific strengths vis-à-vis the inter-
national competition. At the same time, however, 
the focus of software developers on the national 
market and the needs of SMEs constitutes a bar-
rier to the development of higher-grade, export-
able products. 
In the national market Argentine software provid-
ers have a number of comparative advantages 
over their foreign competitors. The prices of the 
products and services they offer are graduated in 
such a way that companies with different needs 
and levels of financial strength are usually able to 
find solutions tailored to their problems. In addi-
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tion, products they offer are geared to the particu-
lar features of the Argentine market. This aspect is 
especially important in producing ERP software 
geared to a variety of national rules and regula-
tions. Frequent changes to the latter call for a high 
level of flexibility. Here national providers have an 
edge over their foreign competitors. One other ad-
vantage enjoyed by Argentine software providers is 
their geographic proximity, a factor which allows 
them establish fast and low-priced customer con-
tacts. 
The focus of Argentine software companies on 
ERP software for national SMEs has led to a nar-
row range of products, mainly geared to the needs 
of accounting and personnel management. More 
specific applications, e.g. integrated process con-
trol in the agricultural industry or the administra-
tion of large warehouses run by logistics compa-
nies, are not offered for sale. Obviously the do-
mestic market lacks the critical mass needed to 
make such developments profitable. 
Many software companies mainly work together 
with SMEs which, for lack of funds and knowl-
edge, do not require much quality. The lack of a 
lead market consisting of demanding customers is 
preventing the providers from engaging in learn-
ing processes and incremental technological im-
provements that can, in the medium term, lead to 
international competitiveness. 
The microlevel problems addressed here are exac-
erbated by deficits in the institutional environment 
of the companies concerned: 
— The software industry has largely developed 
without any external sources of funding. The 
funding needed for both startup and growth 
stemmed almost exclusively from the re-
sources of company owners or from retained 
profits. These companies have no access to 
loans at reasonable terms. Thus far they have 
had to get along without equity capital, in-
deed many of the persons interviewed were 
even unfamiliar with the term. 
— Most of the companies interviewed indicated 
their satisfaction with the training levels of 
Argentine computer professionals, though they 
do complain that thanks to manpower scarcity 
the salaries of highly qualified specialists 
have risen sharply. This is becoming more 
and more of a problem for the SMEs in the 
software industry. 
— It is only in recent years that research and 
development (R&D) in ICT - still insufficient 
in quantity - has begun to emerge in Argen-
tina, and as yet no independent scientific 
community has developed in the country. FDI 
generates hardly any spillover effects, since 
the activities of IT corporations represented 
locally are, with very few exceptions, re-
stricted to sales of hard- and software. This 
means a limited exposure of Argentine soft-
ware companies to innovation impulses and 
up-to-date scientific findings. 
Conclusions for Argentine policy 
In the short term the Argentine government must 
concentrate on appropriately increasing the social 
inputs needed for a technology-oriented develop-
ment as well as for the development of IT compe-
tence. Furthermore, the bottleneck factors noted, 
above all in the field of company financing, must 
be eliminated. Additional measures should focus 
on accompanying innovative companies in their 
startup and growth phases and generally support-
ing IT firms in their efforts geared to internation-
alization. It would be particularly important to 
attract producing branches of foreign direct inves-
tors as a means of encouraging spillover effects in 
the local industry. Finally, another promising 
flanking measure would be to support the use of 
software among Argentine SMEs. 
— To supply the labor market with a sufficient 
number of highly qualified IT specialists, it 
would be necessary to enlarge the relevant 
course of study at the country's universities. 
This would have to involve an increase of 
teaching salaries, since there is presently no 
financial incentive for qualified IT scientists 
to teach at universities. Scholarship programs 
should be developed for students with talents 
in mathematics and computer science, in this 
way mobilizing additional human resources. 
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— Along with training in IT, it would also be 
important to expand relevant R&D activities. 
The aim must be to build a productive scien-
tific community that keeps an eye on, and ac-
tively participates in, the international devel-
opment of the relevant disciplines. Commis-
sioned research and transfer of technology 
from publicly financed research to the private 
sector should be facilitated. Finally, the pub-
lic sector can use subsidies and calls for bids 
on projects geared to computerize public ad-
ministrations as a means of stimulating R&D 
activities in the private sector. 
— Improved access to capital for software com-
panies and other SMEs can be brought about 
by enabling banks to condition loan provision 
not on tangible securities but on the antici-
pated yields of SMEs. Furthermore, it will be 
necessary to go on with the most recent ap-
proaches aimed at establishing a technology 
stock exchange as a means of increasing the 
financial resources available in the venture-
capital market. In addition, the public sector 
could participate directly in venture-capital 
corporations for technology companies. Fi-
nally, it would be feasible to use fairs, compe-
titions, and tax breaks as incentives geared to 
disseminating venture capital. 
— The software industry offers an especially 
good opportunity to create new companies 
with growth potential. The government could 
improve the framework by adjusting the tax 
laws accordingly. Incubator institutions 
(technology and startup centers) created spe-
cifically for the software industry could en-
hance its visibility and increase the survival 
chances and growth potentials of infant com-
panies. 
— Apart from classical instruments of export 
promotion (attendance at fairs, export loans), 
it would be worthwhile looking into other ap-
proaches geared to creating subcontracting re-
lationships or joint ventures with large corpo-
rations. The industry associations and the 
chambers of industry and commerce would 
have an important role to play here. The will-
ingness of foreign software corporations to 
cooperate with local companies can be im-
proved by encouraging these local companies 
to seek certification as per ISO 9000 or the 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM), in this 
way enhancing the transparency of their qual-
ity standards. As a means of accelerating the 
certification process, the government could 
contribute to defraying the costs involved. 
— The only competitive advantage that Argen-
tina has in the international competition for 
software FDI is a highly qualified manpower 
potential. This advantage must be secured and 
enlarged by means of social inputs. On ac-
count of its wage costs, relatively high in in-
ternational terms, Argentina would be best 
advised to increasingly train workers with 
profiles that enable them to offer high-quality 
and creative programming services. Tax in-
centives and elimination of bureaucratic ob-
stacles can be used as flanking measured de-
signed to attract FDI. 
— At present only a small percentage of Argen-
tine SMEs use software. A targeted promo-
tion of modernization would increase com-
pany competitiveness and at the same time 
stimulate the market for IT. Points of depar-
ture would include subsidized credit lines for 
company computerization, subsidization of 
appropriate consulting services, and improved 
market transparency. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The problem addressed by the 
present study 
Today software is a core component of consumer 
goods and industrial production processes, it is 
used to control machine tools, measuring and 
control equipment, and has become a core element 
of modern automotive technology. A broad vari-
ety of services such as those offered by banks and 
insurance companies are being thoroughly 
changed by the use of new information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs), and here, too, 
software plays a key role. Apart from industry and 
economy, the "information revolution" is increas-
ingly changing other areas of social life as well, 
e.g. medicine, leisure activities, and culture. 
The question as to what impacts these processes 
will have on the developing countries is a contro-
versial one. Great expectations are, for instance 
placed, in the fact that the classical barriers to 
access to the stocks of knowledge dispersed 
throughout the world are shrinking: 
„New communication technologies and 
plummeting computing costs are shrink-
ing distance and eroding borders and 
time. The remotest village has the possi-
bility of tapping a global store of knowl-
edge beyond the dreams of anyone living 
a century ago, and more quickly and 
cheaply than anyone imagined only a few 
decades ago“.1 
The counterhypothesis argues with reference to 
the "digital divide," the fact that the resources and 
infrastructure needed to exploit these new techno-
logical potentials are extremely unequally distrib-
uted.2 This is seen as implying that the develop-
ment gap between industrialized and developing 
countries will continue to grow. The 1999 Human 
Development Report notes a growing gap between 
                                                     
1  World Bank (1999), Foreword, p. III.  
2  E.g. Seibel  / Müller-Francke / Bertolini (1999). 
the "knows" and the "know-nots",3 i.e. between 
countries, regions, or individuals that have key 
technological competence and those that do not.4 
The pessimistic prognosis of a technology-driven 
decoupling of the developing countries appears in 
a more grave light when we look not only at the 
use of ICT but at the same time also at the devel-
opment of these technologies and the generation 
of innovations. The by far greater share of knowl-
edge-intensive and creative activities is conducted 
in the industrialized countries of the North, also 
the location of the lead markets in which new 
products and processes are first presented for use. 
The "globalization" of science and innovation has 
until now been largely restricted to the so-called 
triad countries, and the synergies attained here 
threaten to further widen the know-how gap be-
tween industrialized and developing countries. 
The possible use of ICT as a catalyst of develop-
ment processes cannot be viewed in isolation from 
the locations of existing technological compe-
tence. The efficient use of technologies with a 
very short life cycle requires that potential users 
have a good grasp of the specific technological 
state of the art or have access to relevant consult-
ing services in their institutional environment. 
Applied concretely to software, even the search for 
internationally available programs suited to solv-
ing specific problems, the implementation, instal-
lation, and maintenance of such programs require 
a high level of technological competence. In many 
cases international software packages are not de-
signed for local problems and the modifications 
required call for highly qualified programmers. 
Without such competence services must be pur-
chased from international providers or consulting 
companies, and this means prohibitively high 
costs for many potential users in developing coun-
tries, a factor which restricts the spatial and social 
scope of technological innovations.  
                                                     
3  The 1998/99 World Development Report speaks in this 
connection of a knowledge gap. Weltbank (1999), p. 1. 
4  UNDP (1999), p. 57. 
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At least the advanced developing countries are 
also well advised not wholly to abandon the world 
software market to the industrialized countries and 
instead to seek to participate in it by offering such 
products and services with an eye to improving 
current accounts and creating high-grade jobs. As 
opposed to other high-tech industries, the entry 
barriers for software are relatively low, and there 
are a number of countries that have managed, in 
part without any marked tradition of knowledge-
intensive and technology-oriented production, to 
become relevant suppliers in the world market 
(India, Ireland, more recently Costa Rica and 
Uruguay). 
The present study picks up on this international 
discussion on the chances and risks of ICT for 
developing countries. The intention is above all to 
look into the questions what conditions have to be 
given in developing countries if they are to gener-
ate technological competence in IT and which 
policy measures governments can use to support 
this development. 
The field of ICT is a broad and heterogeneous 
one. The present study focuses on information 
technology (IT), and specifically software, for 
three reasons. First, the market for software is 
especially dynamic, even compared with other 
segments of the fast-growing ICT markets. Sec-
ond, the software industry offers providers in de-
veloping countries the advantages of low entry 
barriers in national markets and great develop-
ment potentials, including high-end and techno-
logically demanding products. Third, restriction of 
the problem under consideration to a subsegment 
of the ICT industry seems reasonable in view of 
the complexity of the issue. 
The following section presents the methodology 
used to gather the empirical information needed to 
answer the above-mentioned questions. 
1.2 Methodology of the empirical study 
The present study is the result of empirical sur-
veys conducted in Argentina between February 
and April 2000. The aim of the surveys was to 
come up with propositions, first, on Argentine 
software providers, second, on the use of modern 
information technologies in selected sectors of the 
commercial economy, and, third, on the relations 
between national suppliers and demanders. 
In the period specified 58 Argentine software 
providers were interviewed, most of whom were 
based in Buenos Aires. The subject of the study 
was delineated in terms of the functional criterion 
of whether the company in question provides pro-
gramming services domestically as part of its core 
business. This means excluding on the one hand 
those companies which supply imported software 
in Argentina and on the other hand big corpora-
tions from other industries (banking, health care, 
petrochemicals) that often develop software for 
their own use. 
1.3 Structure of the study and main 
results 
The following, second chapter looks into the 
development relevance of the problem addressed. 
This is done against the background of the fact 
that the study is concerned with modern branches 
of Argentina's industry, a factor that could be seen 
as clashing with the traditional approaches pur-
sued by development cooperation. The study em-
phasizes on this point that it is only the targeted 
use of IT that can guarantee the competitiveness 
of SMEs, in this way safeguarding sustainable 
jobs in the formal sector. Development of an Ar-
gentine IT industry furthermore creates high-grade 
jobs in promising services sectors. Finally, tech-
nological competence can raise the capacity of 
Argentine society on the whole to solve complex 
problems. 
The third chapter provides the study's theoretical 
underpinning. The central concept here is Sanjaya 
Lall's technological capability building. The build-
ing of technological capability in a society pre-
supposes on the one hand that there is a sufficient 
number of competent and learning companies. 
These companies must on the other hand have 
functioning factor markets and adequate institu-
tions available to them and be able to take advan-
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tage of macroeconomic incentives to invest in 
their own technological development. As far as 
factor endowments are concerned, the sector 
mainly needs access to qualified manpower, capi-
tal, and a telecommunications infrastructure. Di-
rect investments of international software corpora-
tions can convey important technological informa-
tion if they develop relevant linkages to national 
actors. Despite the formation of international and 
global relationship systems, the spatial proximity 
of software users to software developers continues 
to play an important role. 
Chapter four, based on the matrix presented by 
Lall, asks whether Argentina is a potential site for 
technologically demanding software production. 
One basic drawback at the microlevel is the phe-
nomenon of dual business structures: on the one 
hand a few large, highly productive corporations, 
on the other a large number of underfunded and 
not particularly innovation-oriented small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The starting 
points for technological modernization are those 
SMEs that are basically able to compete under 
open market conditions. The factor markets pre-
sent a mixed picture: while there is still a good 
potential supply of qualified labor, there are grave 
shortcomings when it comes to financing invest-
ments and technological innovations. 
Following a brief presentation of the secondary 
statistics available on the IT market in Argentina, 
the fifth chapter presents and summarizes the 
results of the survey. The Argentine software in-
dustry consists of a total of some 300 formal en-
terprises that offer permanent employment to 
around 4500 mainly highly qualified workers and 
earn a total of roughly US $ 300 million p.a. Their 
economic activities are concentrated mainly in the 
field of programming business software for SMEs.  
Chapter six deals with the role of software in 
three selected branches of industry which, for 
different reasons, are engaged in modernization 
processes. In the case of the auto part suppliers 
hard international competition and the pressure 
exerted by big customers is forcing companies to 
optimize their operational processes. Argentina's 
traditionally inward-looking winemaking industry 
has recently been looking more and more to ex-
ports, which also forces the companies concerned 
to undertake technical innovations. Logistics is a 
relatively new service industry whose core busi-
ness calls for the administration and processing of 
large quantities of data, and this in turn induces 
them to use modern IT. Above all, innovation-
oriented SMEs display linkages to national soft-
ware producers, since for the former international 
software packages and related services are too 
complex and too expensive. 
Chapter seven, based on the survey, looks into 
the strengths and weaknesses of Argentina's soft-
ware industry at the microeconomic level as well 
as the complexes factor endowments and institu-
tional environment. The close relationships be-
tween national suppliers and demanders of soft-
ware are due above all to the fact that the supply 
is tailored to the specific needs and the purchasing 
power of local SMEs. This imparts to the market a 
certain stability as well as still some – limited – 
growth potentials. If they are in the long run to 
achieve dynamic development with accordingly 
high value added and employment, though, soft-
ware companies will have to diversify their prod-
ucts and services and become active beyond the 
narrow confines of the Argentine market. This 
would mean removing development barriers in the 
business environment, providing for adequate 
possibilities of funding, and training enough 
qualified IT specialists. 
Academic and nonacademic IT research must be 
expanded considerably in order to make Argentina 
more attractive for international scientific cooper-
ation and heighten the industry's innovativeness. 
The process of starting up formal companies 
should be given flanking support and the existing 
companies should be assisted in their efforts to 
gear their operations to the international market. 
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2 Information technology as a means of 
social and economic development 
The following section discusses the significance 
of developing technological competence in the 
field of IT, asking what options are open to the 
public sector. These issues are discussed mainly 
because the present study is concerned with mod-
ern branches of Argentine industry, a circum-
stance that might appear to be in contradiction to 
traditional concerns related to the developing 
countries. 
2.1 Information technologies, company 
modernization, and employment 
For some years now there has been an extensive 
international discussion underway on the chances 
and risks of IT for developing countries. The main 
issue is the risk of a growing "digital divide."5 The 
use of new IT-based media leads to a situation in 
which spatial barriers to economic, social, and 
cultural interaction lose much of their meaning, a 
circumstance which in turn stimulates develop-
ment processes of a new type and accelerates 
those already in progress. This gives rise to inno-
vative forms of education and training, the poten-
tials offered by telemedicine improve the health-
care system, computerized public administration 
makes it possible to radically cut travelling and 
waiting times. The fact that the elementary condi-
tions needed to take advantage of these possibili-
ties (access to a telephone connection and the 
Internet) are extremely unevenly distributed both 
nationally and internationally, will, the fear goes, 
cumulatively intensify existing inequalities. To 
prevent any further deepening of the digital di-
vide, international organizations have prepared a 
number of programs that for the most part aim to 
                                                     
5  E.g. Seibel / Bertolini / Müller-Falcke (1999). 
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increase, in spatial and social terms, the use of IT 
in developing countries.6 Whether the effects of the 
use of IT in business firms will prove desirable or 
undesirable is a controversial question. The most 
widespread thesis is that the increasing IT-based 
automation of production and administration is 
killing jobs, a fact in plain contradiction to the aim 
of development policy to create and safeguard jobs. 
But others counter here that under the conditions of 
increasingly open economies there is no alternative 
to company modernization to the extent that only 
permanently competitive firms are in a position to 
sustainably safeguard jobs and harness growth 
processes to create additional employment.  
Moreover, the production and provision of soft-
ware and other IT services is highly employment-
intensive, and in view of its global dynamics there 
is in this field a worldwide labor market marked 
by constant growth and increasing differentiation. 
With an eye to employment, the aims should thus 
be to produce and provide as many of the services 
needed in the process of company modernization 
at the local level. In the ideal case this would re-
sult in close mutually reinforcing interactions 
between the providers of IT services and their 
users (see Figure 1). 
The need for the public sector to intervene to 
ensure and accelerate the development of techno-
logical competence is bound up with the fact that 
purely market-mediated processes in the fields of 
education and training as well as research and 
development are known not to lead to socially 
desirable results.  
Without any public-sector activity overall social 
investments in education and training tend to miss 
their mark. The reason for this is that only part of 
the returns on private investments in qualification 
and knowledge creation flow back to investors 
in the form of additional profit. Although compe-
tence in computer science is often acquired by 
self-teaching and learning by doing, the discus-
sion over the issue of the international migration 
                                                     
6  For example, the "Information for Development," InfoDev, 
program introduced by the World Bank. 
of IT specialists clearly shows how important it is 
to sufficiently train an adequate number of IT 
specialists in formal, for the most part publicly 
funded training institutions. 
Investments in research and development also 
generate externalities that have positive effects on 
the competitiveness of an economy. The techno-
logical competence due to them is not tied to the 
individuals and organizations in which it emerges 
or is acquired; it can instead be transferred to 
other economic agents via learning processes and 
personnel fluctuation. ECLAC speaks in this con-
text of a society's "knowledge capital."7 But this 
also means that investments in R&D will not 
reach desirable levels if they are made exclusively 
on the basis of private utility rationales. In other 
words, social inputs are needed here too to ensure 
innovativeness. 
2.2 The world market for software and 
IT services 
The following section aims to provide an over-
view of various product categories as a means of 
providing the reader with a more differentiated 
view of the software market. The aim is, first, to 
present a qualitative description of individual 
market segments and ongoing or anticipated de-
velopment trends and, second, to arrive at a quan-
titative assessment of the volumes involved. The 
section looks into the software market in the nar-
rower sense (standardized software products) and 
customized programming services. The latter are 
usually categorized as computer services. 
Software market segments  
The software market breaks down roughly into 
three segments: embedded software includes pro-
grams integrated into physical products and sold 
along with them. An example would be the con-
trol software for electronic weighing scales. 
                                                     
7  Ocampo (1998), p. 18. 
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For the most part the literature does not give sepa-
rate treatment to embedded software, and so there 
are no market data available on this segment and it 
will not be considered here. Standardized, or pack-
aged, software consists of standardized articles 
sold in large quantities. This includes both operat-
ing systems8 and standardized applications pro-
grams.9 The individual programming is used to 
refer to customized programming jobs created spe-
cifically for a customer's needs; the intellectual 
property rights to it are transferred to the customer 
when the job is completed. In statistics, individual 
programming, as opposed to packaged software, is 
generally regarded as a service, and for this reason 
the following look at the market also includes 
computer services. Many software packages are in 
need of comprehensive adaptation to the needs of 
the companies using them, and this as a rule means 
external consulting and programming services 
geared to customizing such software. In what fol-
lows, this type is referred to as "partially standard-
ized software." 
                                                     
8  E.g. DOS, Windows, INIX, Linux, OS/2, etc. 
Software can be further subdivided with an eye to 
function. The International Data Corporation 
(IDC)10 distinguishes three categories: 1. system 
software and utilities, 2. applications tools, and 3. 
applications systems. 
System software and utilities are programs used 
— to control hardware (e.g. operating systems and 
programming languages), improve the efficien-
cy of system administrators, and control the 
flow of data between different hardware units; 
— to safeguard the functioning of programs (e.g. 
antivirus programs) or to convert data from 
one format into another. 
Applications tools include 
— programs used to search, organize, and alter 
data and databases; 
— programs used as decision aids; 
— spreadsheet programs; 
                                                                                  
9  For instance, applications such as word-processing, spread-
sheet programs, and the like, and business software such 
as "Enterprise Resources Planning" (ERP). 
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— computer-assisted software engineering 
(CASE). 
Applications systems include customized solu-
tions for problems specific to an industry or com-
pany function. Such solutions can include specific 
functions such as personnel management, payroll 
accounting, project management, word-process-
ing, and other office activities. But this category 
also includes vertical solutions for specific indus-
tries (e.g. banking, health care, etc.). 
Quantitative development of the market 
It is difficult to prepare a detailed description of 
the software market and the development trends in 
it, since the literature is marked by different ap-
proaches to subdividing the material. The rapid 
pace of technological development makes it im-
possible to delineate any clear-cut and quasi-static 
market segments, and some segments tend to 
merge while others are marked by growing differ-
entiation. The comparability of data from different 
sources is problematic in that the boundaries be-
tween segments are often difficult to define un-
ambiguously. It is even more difficult to assess 
prognoses on the future development of these 
markets. The data presented here should thus be 
regarded as more or less tentative; their main pur-
pose is to identify significant trends.  
The Information Technology Outlook11 of 1997 
estimates the world software market in 1995 to be 
worth US $ 97 billion; IDC assumes a value of 
US $ 154 billion for the year 1999 and the Busi-
ness Software Alliance a value of US $ of 231,8 
Billion for 200112 The market for IT services was 
US $ 178 billion in 1995.13 In the 1990s these 
                                                                                  
10  The IDC is a market-research organization specialized in 
the ICT industry. 
11  OECD (1997), p. 13. 
12  Cf. BSA (2001), S. 8. 
13  The category "software" includes all packaged computer 
programs available in the market. Apart from customized 
software (individual programming), the category "ser-
vices" includes the design, installation, and integration of 
systems as well as related training, IT-related consulting 
markets were marked by extraordinary dynamics, 
with average annual growth rates reaching 15.9 % 
(software) and 12.5 % (computer services).14 One 
general trend is that the market volume of pack-
aged software is rising in relation to individual 
programming. This is explained by the great costs, 
time, and effort involved in individual program-
ming and the growing complexity, power, and 
flexibility of standardized applications programs. 
The growing use of packaged software is accom-
panied by increasing work involved in adapting 
software to individual company and industry needs, 
i.e. by a growing need for services in implementing 
these programs. A Strategy Partners15 study, for 
instance, finds that the license fees for ERP soft-
ware SAP r/3 account for no more than 8 % of the 
costs that accrue during the first five years. Apart 
from end-user efforts and the hardware required, 
the implementation costs, 14 %, are considerable 
higher than the costs for the software itself. The 
suppliers of business software are developing 
more and more industry-specific solutions with an 
eye to reducing the high customization costs.  
The competitive conditions faced by software 
suppliers differ depending on whether latter are 
involved with packaged software or individual 
programming. Providers of packaged software are 
forced to meet high quality standards, and the 
marketing of these products involves large and 
risky capital outlays. The market for packaged 
software is relatively heavily concentrated for this 
reason. For instance, 60 % of the market for PC 
software is controlled by ten companies. On the 
other hand, the entry barriers for customer-
specific programming are relatively low and the 
number of providers is high. Most Latin American 
software companies are also active in this field.16  
                                                                                  
services, and the management of IT systems. The category 
also includes the maintenance and repair of hard- and 
software systems (so-called support services) and the out-
sourcing of IT-intensive company functions. 
14  OECD (1998), p. 34. By comparison, world GDP grew 
by an annual 5.7 %. 
15  Computerwoche 32/99. 
16  Correa (1996), p. 192. 
8 Andreas Stamm 
 
3 Conditions for latecomer development 
of technological competence in the field 
of software: the study's conceptual 
framework 
The last chapter discussed the significance of IT 
in the development process, explaining why de-
veloping countries should aim to build techno-
logical competence of their own. Based on the 
literature available on latecomer development of 
technological competence, the present chapter 
looks into the crucial influencing factors involved 
in the process. This conceptual framework is 
needed to examine what deficits are hampering 
technological dynamics in Argentina and what 
approaches are available for targeted promotion 
policies and measures in the context of interna-
tional development cooperation. Our point of de-
parture here is a concept that was developed by 
Sanjaya Lall at the beginning of the 1990s and is 
used to identify central influencing factors in-
volved in latecomer development of technological 
competence.17 In essence, Lall is concerned with 
the interplay between competent and learning 
firms, functioning factors markets, adequate insti-
tutions, and incentives with a stimulative effect on 
technology development. In a manner similar to 
that involved in the concepts national innovation 
system18 and systemic competitiveness,19 Lall 
proceeds mainly from causal complexes at the 
national level. In view of increasingly global pat-
terns of interaction, it must be asked whether an 
approach of this type still adequately mirrors on-
going processes. Without claiming to present a 
final answer to this question, we cite two impor-
tant reasons that indicate that the key conditions 
for technological competence must be sought at 
the national level, at least when the aim is to 
achieve broad effects above and beyond individ-
ual success stories: 
— The factor markets central to enhancing techno-
logical competence continue to be shaped by 
political decisions made at the national level 
                                                     
17  Lall (1992). 
18  Lundvall (1988). 
19  Esser / Hillebrand / Messner / Meyer-Stamer (1994). 
(investment in education and training, deregu-
lation of the telecommunications market, etc.). 
— The development of new technologies in-
volves close interplay between suppliers and 
users. Personal interactions continue to be of 
great importance in this regard, and spatial 
proximity is in turn an important precondition 
for this. 
3.1 Points of departure for a policy of 
latecomer technological development  
In Lall's complex approach, the point of departure 
and actual source of technological innovation 
processes is the innovative and competent busi-
ness enterprise. Development of company-specific 
technological competence, or "firm-level techno-
logical capabilities" (FTC), rests mainly on three 
factors, namely a company's ability  
— to estimate its capacity to invest in technol-
ogy development ("investment capabilities"); 
— to master, to assimilate, to imitate, to improve 
or independently develop existing process 
and product technologies ("production capa-
bilities"); 
— to build linkages to and to exchange informa-
tion with other actors such as customers, sup-
pliers, upstream service providers and re-
search institutions ("linkage capabilities").20 
Whether companies will want and be able to build 
such skills is dependent on the one hand on inter-
nal and external incentives, on the other hand on 
their own specific factor endowments. For Lall, 
one essential incentive to acquire competence is 
the need to assimilate information and skills when 
a given company decides to introduce new pro-
duction technologies. Like general investment 
behavior, acquisition of technological competence 
is governed by signals that are sent out at the eco-
nomic macrolevel and shape expectations as re-
gards possible future earnings (growth rates, com-
petition, foreign-trade regime). Lall sees interna-
                                                     
20  Lall (1992), p. 169. 
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tional competitive pressure as one of the most 
powerful catalysts involved in the development of 
technological competence in developing coun-
tries, barring market failure, which leads to pro-
hibitively high learning costs for new participants 
in the market. Finally, technological change con-
stitutes an external incentive for companies in 
developing countries to invest in their technologi-
cal competence as a means of closing the gap on 
the processes and products typically used by the 
industrialized countries. 
The extent to which a company is not only willing 
but also able to raise its technological competence 
depends on the one hand on company-specific 
givens such as size and organizational and mana-
gerial skills. But one key factor is always the ex-
tent to which the business environment makes 
possible access to factors that are not available 
internally. 
For Lall, this idea constitutes the transition to the 
concept of "national technological capability". 
Companies develop technological competence not 
in isolation but together with other economic, 
scientific, and governmental actors. It is crucial 
for the formation of specialization advantages that 
technological knowledge diffuses, that synergy 
effects emerge, and, accordingly, that competence 
is built across a broad national level. While every 
company engages in individual innovation and 
technology management of its own, this manage-
ment is subject to a "common element of response 
of firms to the policy, market and institutional 
framework."21 The shape given to a specific frame-
work of this sort leads to nationally different levels 
of technological competence, and this in turn en-
tails different rates of productivity and growth.  
According to Lall, three independent factors in-
fluence the development of national technological 
competence: 1. incentives; 2. factor endowments; 
and 3. institutions (see Fig. 3).  
 
An increase of technological competence entailing 
broad effects can only come about if a sufficient 
number of companies are prepared to invest in 
technological progress. The key to this propensity 
to invest is the incentives effective in the business 
environment; they may be broken down into three 
groups: 
                                                     
21  Lall (1992), p. 169. 
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— The macroeconomic incentives include sig-
nals defined by GDP growth, inflation, inter-
est, and exchange rates as well as by the 
availability of foreign exchange and credit.  
— Competition provides some especially effec-
tive incentives. Domestic competition is in-
fluenced mainly by the size of the national 
industrial sector, the degree of development 
and diversification, and state regulation such 
as laws governing competition. External 
competition comes about through foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), imports, and export-
oriented growth patterns. 
— Incentives operating via factor markets may 
have a positive effect on technological devel-
opment if the latter are flexible and correctly 
reflect relative factor prices, in this way lead-
ing to an efficient allocation of resources. 
A company's factor endowment influences the 
extent to which the company is able to use and 
adapt technology as well as to develop it further 
for the market on an independent basis. Since the 
individual production unit cannot generate the 
factors of production it needs on its own, it must 
demand them in the factor markets. According to 
Lall, there are three types of factor endowment 
that are relevant here: 
— First, a company's endowment with capital is 
a condition that influences its capacity to de-
velop technological competence. Investment 
in technological equipment hinges mainly on 
access to financial capital. If this capital is to 
be used efficiently, an economy must have a 
functioning financial system. 
— Second, an endowment with qualified labor 
must be ensured. Although qualification can 
also be acquired informally by means of on-
the-job training and practical experience 
within the production process, formal qualifi-
cation, as a rule public education and training, 
plays a central role in determining whether 
companies are able to foster their technologi-
cal competence by hiring qualified manpower. 
— Third, a company's endowment with techno-
logical information influences its innovation 
efforts. Technological knowledge comes about 
through company-level R&D, in research in-
stitutions in the company's environment, and 
by means of the possibility to access interna-
tionally available knowledge resources.  
Institutions on the one hand define the frame-
work for the interplay between factor endowment 
and incentives, e.g. in the form of intellectual 
property rights and other legal conditions defining 
the framework of economic activity. Lall on the 
other hand includes specific promotion policies 
and organizations that help to overcome specific 
market failure in his list of institutions important 
to the development of technological competence.22 
Development of technological competence is sup-
ported, for instance, by technical training institu-
tions (technical colleges, training centers, etc.), 
publicly funded basic research, technology-
transfer institutions, and support for business 
startups.23 Building on the heuristic framework 
outlined above, Lall investigates the experiences 
made by a number of Asian and Latin American 
developing countries and NICs in the course of 
their latecomer industrial development. From this 
he concludes that a dynamic development can be 
expected only if correct incentive structures coin-
cide with the development of suitable qualifica-
tions. Lall also sees the targeted import of tech-
nology in a positive light if such efforts are ac-
companied by a strategy of capability creation. 
The success stories also show that selective gov-
ernment interventions aimed at overcoming mar-
ket failure can play a major role here, though only 
when certain conditions are given: 
„Much depends on the competence, 
honesty and political strenght of the pol-
icy makers: where governments are so 
weak or corrupt that selective interven-
tions inevitably lead to the ‘hijacking’ of 
policy by entrenched interests it may be 
better to suffer market failure than per-
vasive ‘government failure’. In such 
cases, however, it is not evident, that 
                                                     
22  This distinction between institution and organization is 
found in North (1992). 
23   For the example of the German innovation system, see 
Stamm (1999). 
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non-intervention would lead to industrial 
success”.24 
3.2 What relevance does a national frame 
of reference have for the development 
of technological competence today? 
No promising strategy aimed at creating techno-
logical capability can be based on a purely in-
ward-looking development. Under today's condi-
tions of largely open markets, protectionist meas-
ures to safeguard technology-oriented activities 
from foreign competition are practically unwork-
able, and should not be aimed for either, since 
such measures imply an intention to attempt to 
modernize companies and institutions without re-
course to international best practice. Instead, the aim 
must be to consciously utilize the technological 
knowledge available throughout the world as an 
essential element within a strategy of technology 
capability creation. This means, among other 
things, building international cooperation and 
attracting branches of big technology corporations 
as well as research and technology-transfer insti-
tutions. 
Despite a growing level of international interac-
tion, there are two weighty arguments indicating 
that, at least for the time being, the national frame 
of reference will continue to have great signifi-
cance for the development of technological com-
petence in modern sectors: 
— The factor markets essential for the ability of 
companies to develop their technological ca-
pability are still organized chiefly at the na-
tional level. 
— Close interactions between producers and users 
play a central role in the development and 
dissemination of technological innovations. 
While these user-producer relationships are 
not necessarily bound to national borders, 
they are fostered by spatial proximity and lin-
guistic and cultural affinities. 
                                                     
24  Lall (1992), p. 183. 
According to Lall the capacity to raise technologi-
cal capability in the field of factor endowments 
depends on whether qualified human ressources, 
capital, and technology-related information are 
available. If we look at the market for qualified 
labor, there is no doubt that the nation state has a 
central role to play here in that it decides on levels 
of social inputs and their distribution within na-
tional education and training systems. The grow-
ing international migration of qualified specialists 
is only gradually altering this situation. In spite of 
globalized financial flows for the time being the 
funding of investments in technology keeps de-
pending on whether a given country has a func-
tioning national credit system and a market for 
venture capital. Changes in the access to technol-
ogy-related information are more obvious. Here it 
is above all the rapid dissemination of the Internet 
that makes fast worldwide sourcing possible. But in 
this context as well, international experience indi-
cates that the transfer of technological information 
between public research institutions and private 
companies often implies complex interaction and 
multiple feedback processes. Geographical prox-
imity between the actors is not a necessary pre-
condition, but clearly facilitates this process.25  
The discussion over innovation and development 
of technological capability increasingly refers to 
the interactive character of these processes as well 
as to the important relationships between the pro-
ducers and the users of technology. 
To develop a new product, a company needs in-
formation on the needs of the potential user. The 
latter in turn must know what individual benefits 
he may derive from the use of new technological 
possibilities. This is why contact between pro-
ducer and user is indispensable to developing new 
technologies. 
User-producer relationships imply intensive ex-
change of information. This calls for longer-term 
relationships that are marked by a certain level of 
                                                     
25  For the example of technology transfer from large-scale 
German research institutions, see Fromhold-Eisebith 
(1995). 
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mutual trust and respect for certain rules, since co-
operation usually entails divulging competition-
relevant technical knowledge and other company 
secrets.26 
The necessity of direct and frequently repeated 
contacts between producers and users implies that 
the geographic and cultural proximity of the ac-
tors involved is of crucial importance during the 
phase of interactive product development.27 This 
in turn means that despite the increasing global-
ization of economy and society the spatial dimen-
sion of exchange relations continues to be of great 
importance. 
How important the spatial dimension is depends on 
the type of product or technology under develop-
ment. This applies particularly on its degree of 
standardization. With standardized technologies it 
is possible to code information and effectively con-
vey it over great distances; here there is practically 
no need for spatial proximity. If however, the issue 
at hand is complex technologies that change quick-
ly and radically and are marked by short product 
cycles, geographic proximity can have a decisive 
impact on producers and users alike. In these 
cases personal contact and a common cultural 
background may be essential to any transfer of 
uncodable knowledge, so-called tacit knowledge. 
The nation state has an important role to play in 
the use-producer interaction. As e.g. Porter's study 
on national competitive advantages shows, exact-
ing demand conditions, which may arise due to 
competent users in the domestic market, may have 
positive effects on technology development. This 
in turn can lead to the formation of competitive 
advantages for the companies in these industries,28 
a fact that can be demonstrated quantitatively with 
the aid of econometric analysis.29 According to 
Lundvall as well, the interaction between produc-
ers and users within national boundaries is, for 
                                                     
26  Lundvall (1988), p. 352. 
27  Goddard / Richardson (1996); Porter / Sölvell (1998). 
28  Porter (1993). 
29  Fagerberg (1996). 
several reasons, particularly efficient. Aside from 
geographic and cultural proximity and a shared 
language, government action plays a major role 
here; it can use national standards and regulations 
to simplify user-producer interaction, or at least to 
unify it by placing it on a legal footing. Direct 
government support for certain technologies can 
also reinforce this process. As a large and espe-
cially demanding and competent user of certain 
products, the public sector can play a crucial role 
in the development of technological competence. 
3.3 Factors influencing technological 
capability development in the soft-
ware industry 
The set of conditions presented by Lall as neces-
sary for the broad-based development of techno-
logical capabilities were worked out on the basis 
of latecomer technological development in the 
manufacturing industries. As yet no comparable 
concept has been developed for business services 
in general or for the software sector in particular. 
It is plausible that important influencing factors 
like access to qualified human ressources and 
funding possibilities are also of great relevance 
here, though there are some differences at the 
qualitative level. The following section looks into 
them in detail. 
One factor determining the development of com-
petent companies in the IT industry, and one that 
has not yet come in for consideration, is physical 
access to telecommunications infrastructure as 
well as the conditions under which this access is 
effected. These issues are discussed in the further 
course of the study.  
Some countries have managed during the last two 
decades to overcome their development lag and 
become important suppliers of IT services in the 
world market (e.g. India, Ireland, Israel). In all 
such cases the key factor was success in attracting 
international technology corporations. What fol-
lows will for this reason look into the possible 
role of foreign direct investment for the develop-
ment of technological competence. Finally, the 
section discusses the significance and possible 
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formulation of user-producers relationships, since 
one might assume that while the latter also play a 
role in the IT industry, they no longer display any 
close spatial ties due to the new possibilities of 
rapidly transferring large quantities of data. 
Human ressources in the software indus-
try: needs and requirements 
In his analytic framework on the development of 
technological capabilities, Lall pointed out that 
availability of qualified labor is of crucial impor-
tance. In software programming this aspect is 
becoming all the more urgent as the field's grow-
ing complexity places demands on human res-
sources that are not only growing but are also 
subject to constant change. What this means is a 
need for national education and training systems 
in developing countries to generate technological 
knowledge with special reference to software 
development and to transfer and constantly update 
this knowledge. 
Software development can be characterized with 
reference to four features central to it: it is knowl-
edge-intensive, subject to a fast-moving techno-
logical progress, complex, and involves a high 
share of tacit knowledge. 
— Software development is knowledge-inten-
sive. Access to a sufficient quantity of highly 
qualified workers is becoming the key factor 
determining the innovativeness and competi-
tiveness of software companies. There is a 
special need here for university and college 
graduates trained in computer science and 
mathematics as well as engineers and scien-
tists.30 In the medium term it must be antici-
pated that the demand for simple program-
ming services will decline in favor of more 
highly qualified expertise in software and in-
formation technologies.31  
— Software development is subject to a fast-
moving process of technological change 
                                                     
30  World Bank (1998), pp. 42f. 
31  Schware (1992), p. 147. 
characterized by extremely short innovation 
and product life cycles.32 To avoid the risk of 
losing touch with this progress, even the de-
veloping countries have to search for ways to 
give their software companies access to com-
prehensive and constantly updated knowledge 
on technological development. R&D and 
training are growing increasingly important, 
national training systems have to impart the 
capacity for lifelong learning. 
— Software development is becoming increas-
ingly complex and calls for knowledge that 
goes beyond purely technical know-how. Due 
to the trend toward object-oriented program-
ming,33 software is now often produced in 
different teams that may be located in differ-
ent countries. Software must meet stringent 
quality standards34 and is confronted with in-
creasingly specific and exacting customer 
needs. Firms providing high-grade program-
ming services are therefore dependent on a 
labor supply that combines IT competence 
with the ability to implement customer-
specific solutions and engage in effective 
marketing. Accordingly, the ability to work in 
interdisciplinary teams and on projects as 
well as management skills and service and 
consulting capacities are of considerable im-
portance here.35  
— Despite its high degree of formalization, soft-
ware development contains a significant share 
of tacit knowledge. The development process 
does not proceed along the lines of clearly de-
fined, fixed rules and methods.36 It is for this 
reason that both specific individual program-
                                                     
32  Correa (1996), p. 172. 
33  In producing object-oriented software, the programs are 
made up of separately developed modules that run indi-
vidual program routines. Since the individual modules 
must interact without any snags, coordination between 
teams is of crucial importance. 
34  Including program stability or data integrity. Adequate 
quality management is seen as a decisive future competi-
tive factor; it is geared to the ISO 9000 standard. 
35  Schware (1992), p. 147; Correa (1996), p. 173. 
36  Schware (1992), p. 146. 
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mer experience and creativity constitute the 
decisive components that on the one hand 
qualify the programmer to tackle complex 
tasks in design and development and on the 
other hand give rise to software innovations. 
Both the software companies and public insti-
tutions should therefore have a real interest in 
training their workers on a continuous and 
permanent basis.  
What challenges can we identify on the basis of 
the above-named features of software develop-
ment for national education and training systems 
in developing countries? 
— One focus of education and training systems 
should be IT, engineering, and sciences. Such 
education and training should also impart 
cross-cutting skills, including knowledge of 
business matters. 
— IT curricula should be constantly adapted to 
the state of the art of technology. 
— Training should be practice-oriented and should 
also be conducted at vocational schools and 
technical colleges. What is called for here is 
close cooperation between the public and pri-
vate sectors as a means of ensuring that train-
ing is in line with actual needs. 
— Training capacities in software development 
should be available at the company level as 
well. 
— Care should be taken to ensure a large meas-
ure of autonomy and competition between 
private and public training centers. 
— An introduction to the new media should be 
part of the curriculum at schools providing 
general education. 
Access to capital 
The software industry is marked by a high share 
of infant companies. These companies need capi-
tal for their startup and often to finance rapid 
growth. Internal funding from profits, reserves 
and writeoffs is often impossible. There are usual-
ly two external sources available for external 
funding: loans and equity capital. In developing 
countries there are barriers to access to both 
sources of funding. 
Even today the access of small businesses to the 
credit market is sharply restricted.37 The main 
reason for this is that banks and lending institu-
tions demand conventional tangible security (e.g. 
mortgages) or bonds that small business are un-
able to come up with. In the software industry the 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that it invests 
more in personnel than in tangible assets. 
Venture capital is a means of business financing 
that makes use of risk-bearing equity capital or 
similar forms of investment capital, with the in-
vestor in this way becoming actively involved in 
the company's interests for the period of his in-
vestment. This may be a time-limited investment 
with disinvestment in three to eight years. The 
advantages offered by venture capital include the 
following: 
— Unlike in the case of credits, there are no 
fixed limits on the availability of venture 
capital to a company. 
— Venture capital is liable in the event of a 
company crisis. 
— Venture capital does not burden a company in 
the same way as loans with periodical pay-
ments (interests, amortization). 
— Venture capital improves a company's capital 
structure, distinctly enhancing later chances 
of obtaining credit for financing purposes. 
The disadvantages of venture capital include re-
strictions on autonomous decision-making of the 
entrepreneurs as well as investor participation in 
the appreciation of the company's value.  
The developing countries are marked by an ex-
tremely limited supply of venture capital. Tech-
nology-oriented startups are at an additional dis-
advantage as far as access is concerned. This is 
                                                     
37  Lepp (1996), p. 77. 
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mainly due to the high risk associated with financ-
ing technology companies via venture capital.38 
The problems facing any financing of software 
companies in developing countries by means of 
risk capital are encountered in all three phases of 
financing (see Box 1). As a rule, in raising funds 
with investors such as banks, insurance compa-
nies, the government, or well-off private persons, 
joint ventures fail to secure the capital they need. 
They are for this reason unable to come up with any 
sufficient risk diversification of their portfolios. It 
is particularly difficult to appraise newly founded 
software companies since theirs are often wholly 
new business segments for which there are no past 
reference data and whose market tendencies are 
unclear. Moreover, in the developing countries 
that are without any functioning stock market 
there can be no disinvestment via an initial issue 
of shares. The danger here is that capital investors 
will be unable to realize profits that accrue when 
companies appreciate in value.  
Access to the telecommunications market 
Access to the telecommunications market is a nec-
essary condition for the production and use of 
                                                     
38  On the risks faced by technology companies, see BMWi 
(1999), p. 2. 
software and associated services, which are in-
creasingly based on the Internet or related to other 
types of electronic data transmission. Access is 
determined by the network infrastructure (tele-
phone network, cell-phone network, etc.) and user 
fees.  
The supply structure in most telecommunications 
markets has diversified since the 1980s. The end 
of government monopolies has made it possible 
for many developing countries to lower their tele-
phone costs and improve services. 
In the past the network infrastructure was seen as 
having the characteristics of a natural monopoly, 
i.e. efficient operation was assumed to be possible 
only by one supplier in the market.39 This assump-
tion was based on two arguments. First, when the 
number of participants rises, economies of scale 
lead to declining costs per subscriber connection. 
Second, market access is associated with high 
initial investments that cannot be used for other 
purposes in the case of market exit, and are thus 
irreversible (sunk costs). The existence of a natu-
ral monopoly was advanced as a justification for 
provision of services by government or an enter-
prise supervised by government. But as experi-
ence with government-owned telecommunications 
monopolies shows, these failed to lead to optimal 
solutions, particularly in the developing countries. 
                                                     
39  Arnold (1999), p. 4f. 
Box 1: Phases and functioning of venture-capital financing 
Financing via venture capital consists of three phases:a investment decision, involvement in the joint venture, and dis-
investment.b 
The investment-decision phase includes, first, the acquisition of the capital needed (fund-raising) and the potential portfo-
lio companies (deal flow). It, second, includes an appraisal of the company in search of capital. An examination process 
(due diligence) entails comparing the investment profile with the demands of the associated company, quantifying possi-
ble risks. This is followed, third, by the investment negotiations aimed at concluding an association contract. 
Depending on company development and the exit strategy selected, the involvement phase may extend anywhere from 
three to eight years. This active involvement entails a number of tasks. These include support for the company's man-
agement, aid in selecting a management team, mediation of all sorts of contacts, tracking down possible promotion 
programs and aids available to manage short-term crises. The disinvestment phase ensures the pay-back of the capital 
invested and the anticipated returns. The exit point depends on the one hand on the company's economic development, 
on the other hand on the possible exit strategies. Possible exit strategies include sales to another company (trade sales), 
sale to another associated company (secondary purchase), a buyback of these shares by the company concerned and the 
process of going public. 
a This applies only for the formal venture-capital market, in which joint ventures act in the capacity of capital intermediaries 
b Betsch / Gloh / Lohmann (1998), p. 232; Zemke (1998), p. 212 
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Inefficiency and a lack of maintenance and expan-
sion investments led to a poor supply of services, 
and a low coverage of rural regions.  
Liberalization of the telecommunications markets 
in the industrialized and developing countries has 
shown that competition in this industry is techno-
logically possible and can bring with it a number 
of advantages for both private and business sub-
scribers: 
— Telecommunications costs for the most part 
decline drastically in the wake of liberaliza-
tion and privatization. 
— New connections are provided far faster. 
— Suppliers operate with an eye to customer 
wishes, e.g. as regards additional services. 
If these advantages of a liberalized telecommuni-
cations market are to be fully realized, this market 
must be regulated.40 The regulatory authority must 
on the one hand ensure that new providers are 
given access to existing networks at reasonable 
terms and on the other hand guarantee provision 
of full services on a broad basis.41  
The role of foreign direct investment in the 
software industry 
Foreign direct investment can play an important 
role in noticeably accelerating technological dy-
namics in countries and regions without any 
marked tradition of knowledge-intensive produc-
tion. This is proved by recent IT success stories 
such as India and Ireland. Broad dissemination 
effects can be reached mainly in cases in which 
the FDI entails linkages with national compa-
nies.42 The most important spillover effects that 
result from these linkages include: 
— development and improvement of products 
and processes; 
                                                     
40  World Bank (1999), p. 83. 
41  Arnold (1999), p. 6. 
42  For further spillover effects between multinational cor-
porations and SMEs, see Altenburg (2000). 
— expansion of technical management skills on 
the part of national actors; 
— new business startups (spinoffs), in particular 
in the software industry, by former employees 
of foreign firms. 
It is customary to distinguish between cross-
industry and industry-specific linkages as well as 
between upstream and downstream linkages. 
Cross-industry technological spillover effects 
result from linkages of foreign software investors 
with upstream or downstream national actors 
within the value-added chain. The outsourcing 
potentials available to software corporations in-
clude on the one hand procurement of media 
(diskettes, CD-ROMs). Since these are standard-
ized products they give no reason to expect any 
far-reaching spillover effects. But such corpora-
tions may also outsource demanding program-
ming services, e.g. external development of indi-
vidual software modules. 
The variety of downstream linkages is greater; it 
includes 
— joint further development of software by for-
eign corporations and local customers with an 
eye to customizing software to user needs; 
— customer support in process optimization once 
a particular software has been introduced; 
— cooperation with consulting firms specialized 
in implementing software; 
— schooling for software users; 
— cooperation with retailers and wholesalers 
(e.g. with specialized dealers); 
— cooperation with providers of after-sales ser-
vices (e.g. schooling and technical support); 
— cooperation with companies that develop 
software building on the platforms of foreign 
investors. 
The more foreign corporations concentrate on 
their own core activity, outsourcing other activi-
ties, the greater the chances are that linkages will 
materialize with national suppliers. A high degree 
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of linkage in turn increases the likelihood of tech-
nological spillover effects. The type and dimen-
sions of such linkages are the result of make-or-
buy decisions influenced by cost and quality crite-
ria. The foreign corporation compares its own 
production costs with the costs (market price and 
transaction costs) that would result from purchas-
ing from outside producers domestically or abroad. 
Foreign direct investors in the software industry 
will furthermore only be willing to purchase their 
intermediate products and services from national 
suppliers if the latter are able to provide the re-
quired quality of products and services. 
Industry-specific technological spillover effects 
are those effects on national competitors that are 
sparked by the corporate activities of foreign di-
rect investors. The market entry of foreign inves-
tors can entail both positive and negative effects 
on the competitiveness of national software sup-
pliers. The type of influence that emerges will 
depend on the absorptive capacity and the innova-
tiveness of national competitors, the market-entry 
strategy, and the level of the competitive advan-
tage enjoyed by the foreign investor.43  
— Absorptive capacity and innovativeness de-
termine the speed at which national competi-
tors will be able to adjust to the competitive 
domestic situation. National suppliers can 
strengthen their competitiveness by recogniz-
ing the importance of R&D activities and the 
necessity of quality assurance and by seeking, 
by imitation or innovation, to come closer to 
meeting the quality standards of such foreign 
corporations. It is in this way that foreign in-
vestors can contribute to an upgrading of the 
technological competence of their national 
competitors. 
— Furthermore, the market-entry strategy of 
foreign software suppliers also has effects on 
the competitiveness of national providers. If 
market entry is effected by acquiring national 
companies or company shares, the result can 
be a concentration of R&D activities on the 
side of the foreign corporations, which would 
                                                     
43  Dunning (1993), p. 446f. 
entail negative impacts on the competitive-
ness of national suppliers. 
— Pronounced competitive advantages of foreign 
direct investors (e.g. new technologies, mar-
keting budget) can create high barriers to 
market entry, in this way diminishing the 
competitiveness of national competitors. 
The increased domestic competitive pressure due 
to the market entry of foreign investors in the 
software industry forces national suppliers to im-
prove their products and processes. Moreover, 
positive spillover effects can result from a drift of 
specialists from foreign investors to national com-
petitors, since these specialists have accumulated 
specific expert knowledge through training on the 
job and targeted advanced training measures.  
3.4 The user-producer interaction in the 
software industry 
In the field of customized software in particular, 
producers work closely together with the later 
users of programs.44 But the providers of pack-
aged software also seek contact with end users in 
developing new products by providing their pro-
grams to users per Internet as a means of innova-
tively harnessing feedback responses. 
The development process of software products 
begins with the definition of product requirement 
profiles on the basis of which, in a second step, 
the product is then designed. In a third phase this 
design is operationalized by specialists into mod-
ules and submodules prior, finally, to being im-
plemented, i.e. transformed into a source code in 
a given programming language. The especially 
knowledge-intensive and time-consuming stages 
include the preparation of a requirement profile 
and the actual design of the software. 
                                                     
44  Weltz / Ortmann (1992), pp. 75ff.; the following discus-
sion on the development of software are further based on 
talks with a programmer with the German research cen-
tre "GMD - Forschungszentrum für Informationstechnik." 
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During the entire process there is continuous con-
tact and exchange of information between the 
producer and the user of the software in question. 
The most intensive period of user-producer inter-
action is in the initial phase involving the joint 
developer-user definition of requirements. Trust-
based exchange of information and personal con-
tact play an important role in software develop-
ment, as is shown by the following quotation on 
the sequence of a software project: 
"One essential quality of this approach 
and its particular effectiveness were, not 
least, its informal character and the per-
sonal familiarity between developers and 
users. This provided the conditions under 
which the development task to be solved 
could be handled flexibly and without 
strain, and this in turn made it possible 
to come up with a compromise between 
the technical and specialist requirements 
without unduly wasting time and effort. 
This, though, absolutely presupposed 
continuity in terms of the personnel ac-
tive here."45 
It may be noted by way of summary that the user-
producer interaction in software development is of 
great significance. While with packaged software 
these contacts are conducted informally per Inter-
net, customized software again and again calls for 
personal contacts, and this means that the advan-
tages involved in close spatial relationships con-
tinue in effect. 
4 Argentina - a potential location for 
technologically demanding software 
production? 
Argentina, an NIC, is practically unknown as a 
provider of technologically demanding products 
and services in international markets. Its role in 
the international division of labor has until now 
mainly consisted in exporting bulk agricultural 
                                                     
45  Weltz / Ortmann (1992), p. 76, our translation. 
and agroindustrial goods and importing the 
knowledge-intensive products it needs.  
Based on Lall's framework, the following chapter 
looks into the conditions required for a broadly 
effective development of technological capabili-
ties that exist in Argentina. At the microlevel we 
find here severe deficits stemming from a dual 
enterprise structure and a low propensity to inno-
vate. Companies aiming to raise their competi-
tiveness through innovation have access to quali-
fied workers in the Argentine labor market; but 
the current situation is marked by a severe lack of 
financing capabilities, and also access to the in-
formation required is limited. The incentives in 
the business environment are ambiguous. Though 
the country reaches high growth rates in some 
years, Argentina is far from any stable economic 
dynamics. While in 1990 it managed to achieve 
price stability, this development was bought at the 
expense of an excessively high exchange rate and 
high real interests rates. The country's scientific 
and technology-related institutional structure is 
underdeveloped and underfunded, which means 
that innovation-minded companies will find little 
encouragement here. 
4.1 The conditions for the development of 
technological capabilities at the com-
pany level 
According to Lall, the development of technologi-
cal capability proceeds from firms that are both 
willing and able to innovate. Seen in these terms, 
the initial conditions in Argentina are extremely 
unfavorable in that the country is marked by a 
sharply dualistic enterprise structure: a core of no 
more than 500 highly productive, technologically 
competent, and export-oriented corporations as 
opposed to roughly 890 000 SMEs. The big cor-
porations account for some 40 % of GDP, in 1997 
their share of export earnings was even 65 %.46 
The great majority of the country's SMEs is ori-
ented to the domestic market and is marked by 
low productivity figures. Kosacoff and López 
                                                     
46  Kosacoff / López (1998). 
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break down Argentine SMEs into three groups 
reflecting their competitiveness: 
— The first group is competitive and techno-
logically competent enough to produce to in-
ternational standards. The group includes only 
around 5 % of all Argentine companies. 
— The second group is far away from interna-
tional competitiveness. Thanks not least to 
their lack of technological capabilities, the 
companies in it - they account for roughly 
30 % of all Argentine SMEs - have to fear for 
their survival. 
— The third group is only conditionally com-
petitive. Its members are going to be faced 
with great challenges if they are to survive in 
the future. The group includes some 65 %, 
the majority, of all Argentine SMEs.47  
The propensity to technological innovation is low 
in Argentina's private sector. Seen in terms of 
company R&D expenditures and its share in GDP, 
Argentina is about average as compared with 
other Latin American NICs and lags far behind 
the industrialized countries (see Table 1). 
The user-producer interactions between suppliers, 
purchasers, and final customers are very weak in 
Argentina; this is generally seen as one reason why 
the country is making little headway in developing 
                                                     
47  Kosacoff / López (1998), p. 23. 
technological capabilities.48 As suppliers of goods 
and services for large corporations, SMEs play no 
more than a subordinate role in Argentina.49  
Compared with Latin America as a whole, Argen-
tina's workers have above-average qualifica-
tions, in particular as far as general education is 
concerned. Illiteracy, which affected some 4 % of 
the adult population in 1998, is no longer consid-
ered a significant factor; in regional terms, second-
ary school attendance is above average. Tertiary 
training shows an uneven picture: the figures for 
the most important indicators (share of college 
graduates and researchers as a percentage of the 
overall population, share of technology-related 
courses in tertiary training as a whole) are quite 
high compared with other Latin American coun-
tries, though the gap separating Argentina from 
the OECD countries is considerable (see Table 2). 
One alarming fact is that the number of students 
in sciences and engineering has declined by 7 % 
in the past ten years.50  
For the great majority of Argentine companies 
access to capital constitutes a real problem. In the 
1990s the Argentine capital market was reformed, 
raising its efficiency. While this improved the 
possibilities of financing open to large corpora-
                                                     
48  Chudnovsky (1999), p. 160. 
49  Pastor / Wise (1999), pp. 486f. 
50  Chudnovsky (1999), p. 161. 
Table 1: Company R&D expenditures, an international comparison 
 Investments in R&D 
in million US $ 
Percentage of GDP Company share of R&D  
expenditures 
Argentina 371 0.12  % 29  % 
Brazil 2495 0.35  % 46  % 
Chile 15 0.02  % 3  % 
Mexico 184 0.06  % 21  % 
Spain 2703 0.44  % 49  % 
US 136116 1.73  % 75  % 
Germany 24529 1.50  % 66  % 
Source:  GACTEC (1999) 
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tions, it did little to improve the situation of 
SMEs. Up to the present those SMEs that have 
access to official or unofficial credit markets were 
forced to pay interest rates two or three times as 
high as those paid by large companies.51 
The economy's pronounced inward orientation 
and an inadequately developed innovation system 
are responsible for the fact that access to technol-
ogy-related information is difficult. Empirical 
studies show that it is mainly SMEs that have 
trouble obtaining or processing the information 
they need for purposes of modernization or reor-
ganization.52 Due to such information deficits it is 
very difficult for these companies to derive any 
benefits from the access to foreign technologies 
facilitated by trade liberalization. 
                                                     
51  Pastor / Wise (1999), p. 487. 
52  Kosacoff / López (1998). pp. 20-22. 
4.2 Incentives from the business environ-
ment 
The 1990s present an uneven picture for the macro-
economic incentives that motivate companies to 
invest in the development of technological compe-
tence: the first years of the decade were marked 
by very high growth rates, which were interrupted 
toward the end of the decade by a sharp recession. 
By 1996 the country had managed to bring down 
inflation rates to zero. Loan costs were also low-
ered, though they stabilized at a rather high level 
(see Table 3). 
For Lall, the incentives provided by competition 
are of particular significance in stimulating in-
vestment in technology. In Argentina the 1990s 
were marked by a rapid increase of competition 
leaving many companies without the possibility to 
respond adequately. Domestic competition was 
raised by the privatization of government-owned 
companies (airlines, railroads, the postal service, 
telecommunications). But in fact for two reasons 
the dynamics stimulated in this way lagged behind 
expectations: 
Table 2: Performance of the Argentine education system 
 Enrolment rate 
Secondary school 
(1995) 
College graduates per 
1000 residents  
(1995) 
Percentage of scien-
tists and engineers 
Researchers per  
1000 employees 
Argentina 59  % 1.08 24.50  % 1.84 
Brazil 19  % 1.49 17.10  % 0.67 
Chile  55  % 1.15 33.00  % 1.32 
Spain 94  % 4.40 21.80  % 3.25 
Canada 92  % 4.20 12.80  % 5.50 
US 89  % 1.90 39.50  % 7.40 
Source:  RICYT (1999); World Bank (1998) 
Table 3: Argentina. Changes of important macroeconomic indicators, 1991-1999 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP 10.6 % 9.6 % 5.7 % 8 % -4 % 4.8 % 8.6 % 4.2 % -3.5 % 
Inflation  84 % 17.5 % 7.4 % 2.7 % 1.6 % 0.1 % 0 % 0 % -1.8 % 
Interest rate 
(interbank) 
71 % 15.1 % 6.3 % 7.7 % 9.5 % 6.2 % 6.6 % 6.8 % 7 % 
Source:  IMF (1998, 1999a) 
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— The former publicly owned companies went 
for the most part to foreign corporations 
which, beyond purchasing and modernizing 
existing plant and equipment, made very few 
expansion investments. 
— Due to insufficient regulation and market 
supervision many companies were sold on 
unfavorable terms.53 Costly private monopo-
lies emerged in the telecommunications sec-
tor, leading to high charges for services.54  
Liberalization of external trade increased external 
competition more than internal competition. Up 
to 1995 the liberalization process was driven by 
Argentina's participation in two trade agreements. 
On the one hand, the government managed, in 
connection with the "Uruguay Round" of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to 
abolish most nontariff trade barriers as well as to 
substantially lower average import tariffs. The 
import tariff on capital goods and raw materials 
was even eliminated altogether. On the other hand, 
in 1994 the Argentine government entered into a 
customs union with Brazil, Paraguay and Uru-
guay, the MERCOSUR agreement (Mercado 
Comun del Sur).55 Since January of 1995 there has 
been a common external tariff of between 0 % and 
20 % covering 90 % of customs items. Many Ar-
gentine SMEs were unable to respond appropri-
ately to the drastically rising external competition, 
the number of company closures increased rapidly. 
The incentives provided by factor markets in 
Argentina were shaped by a more efficient capital 
market, a still inflexible labor market, and a liber-
alized technology market.  
— The capital market was made more efficient 
by a reform of the Argentine financial sys-
tem. Above all, the central bank's autonomy 
                                                     
53  For a general presentation, see Pastor / Wise (1999), pp. 
487-490. For a specific presentation of the situation of 
insufficient regulation in the processes of liberalizing the 
telecommunications market, see Arnold (1999). 
54  IMF (1998), pp. 5-6; Pastor / Wise (1999), pp. 487-489. 
55  Pastor / Wise (1999), pp. 486-487, 498. 
was strengthened and a number of provincial 
banks were privatized.56 
— Thoroughgoing reforms of the labor market 
were undertaken only in 1998 and 2000, and 
their scope is as yet unclear. Until very re-
cently excessive regulations, collective wage 
agreements reflecting the interests of parties 
and unions, and high mandatory employer 
contributions to union health-insurance 
schemes (that offer few services) unnecessar-
ily increased the price of the factor labor, re-
inforcing a tendency to shed workers into the 
informal labor markets.57  
— The technology market benefited from Argen-
tina's trade liberalization. Practically every type 
of technology is available today via FDI, imports 
of capital goods, and franchising/ licensing. 
4.3 Institutions and technology policy 
Since the 1950s the Argentine government has for 
the most part pursued its technology objectives 
via a number of publicly sponsored research insti-
tutions. But the linkages between these institu-
tions and the country's businesses are weak and 
the institutional structure has not yet succeeded in 
promoting an efficient diffusion of technological 
knowledge into the private sector. The end of the 
1990s saw the launch of a number of institutional 
reforms, but their impacts have yet to materialize. 
What follows is a brief sketch of the country's 
most important research institutions: 
— The National Council on Science and Technol-
ogy (CONICET) was founded in the 1950s and 
today is still the country's leading research insti-
tution. CONICET has 198 associated scientific 
institutions, eleven regional research centers, 
and roughly 7500 employees.58 Since 1984 at-
tempts have been underway to use technology-
transfer offices as a means of strengthening 
linkages with the business sector. 
                                                     
56  IMF (1998), p. 6. 
57  The Economist, Oct. 23, 1999. 
58  Katz / Bercovich (1993), p. 467. 
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— The National Institute for Agricultural Tech-
nology (INTA) employs roughly 5000 per-
sons, some 1900 of them engineers and scien-
tists. INTA is relatively closely connected with 
agriculture, and the R&D efforts undertaken 
by the institute achieve quite broad effects.59 
— By contrast, the effectiveness of the national 
Institute for Industrial Technology (INTI) 
tends to be assessed as relatively low.60 INTI 
has the task of carrying out research and de-
velopment programs with the private sector. 
The institute is further in charge of elaborat-
ing industrial standards. 
— At the end of the 1980s the National Atomic 
Energy Commission (CNEA) employed some 
6000 persons and absorbed roughly 17 % of 
total public expenditure on R&D. This indi-
cates a high priority given to military and ci-
vilian nuclear research for some decades. In 
addition, since the 1950s the army has oper-
ated a research institute for military technol-
ogy (CITEFA) of its own. 
Though Argentina maintains a number of in part 
personnel-intensive research institutions, as far as 
public investment in science and technology is 
concerned, the country lags far behind the indus-
trialized countries, but also behind the other Latin 
American NICs (see Table 4). 
                                                     
59  Katz / Bercovich (1993), p. 469. 
60  Chudnovsky (1999), p. 161. 
In 1996 the Argentine government set out to re-
form its research and technology policy. Its stated 
aim was to raise the percentage of funds spent on 
science and technology by both the public and the 
private sector to 1 % of GDP. 
A special institution, the National Agency for the 
Promotion of Science and Technology (AGEN-
CIA), was set up to more efficiently channel the 
funds provided to support public and private re-
search. AGENCIA is equipped with two financial-
support instruments: the Fund for Science and 
technology (FONCYT) and the Argentine Tech-
nology Fund (FONTAR). 
— FONCYT uses publicly announced competi-
tions to subsidize research projects, the re-
sults of which are published in scientific pub-
lications or which are assumed to have the 
character of a public good, even if they are 
initially available only to a company for use 
and exploitation. 
— FONTAR uses subsidies and subsidized 
loans to fund innovations and measures 
aimed at technological modernization in pri-
vate companies. Until 1990 50 % of the 
funds stemmed from the Argentine budget 
and 50 % from the Interamerican Develop-
ment Bank (IDB).61 
                                                     
61  AGENCIA (1999); conversation with Jorge Fontanals of 
the Secretaria de Ciencia y Tecnología (SECYT) on Jan. 
20, 2000, in Berlin. 
Table 4: Public investment in science and technology, 1996 (Argentina and reference countries) 
 Investment in science and technology  
(in million US $) 
Percentage of GDP 
 Argentina 984 0.33  % 
 Brazil 4 107 0.61  % 
 Chile 310 0.60  % 
 Mexico 1 039 0.31  % 
 Spain 2 464 0.52  % 
 US 66 822 0.87  % 
 Germany  14 785 0.99  % 
Source:  GACTEC (1997) p. 78 
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On the whole, Argentina's institutional system 
designed to promote technological innovations is 
underdeveloped and chronically underfinanced. 
There are hardly any linkages between universi-
ties and private companies in the field of R&D, 
there is practically no support for business start-
ups in technology-relevant areas. In their con-
crete formulation, the promotion programs oper-
ated by FONCYT and FONTAR are largely in 
line with international best practice in technology 
promotion. But their financial endowment is wholly 
inadequate to deal with the massive problems with 
which the better part of Argentine firms are faced 
in funding technological innovations.62 
5 The Argentine software sector: 
structure and dynamics 
Thus far no comprehensive studies have been 
published on the Argentine software industry. The 
industrial federations and chambers of commerce 
have no comprehensive and reliable data that 
could be used to describe the sector's structure and 
dynamics. In the literature available internation-
ally there are, beyond the well-known success 
stories à la Bangalore, hardly any studies on the 
providers of high-grade IT services in developing 
countries and NICs. The present study thus has 
pilot character. The following chapter starts out 
with a brief analysis of the most important second-
ary data on the Argentine IT market (5.1.) and 
then presents the information gleaned from the 
survey of software suppliers (5.2 to 5.5). 
                                                     
62  Interview with Fernando Porta of the Instituto de Estudios 
Sociales de la Ciencia y la Tecnología (IEC), Dec. 14, 
1999, Berlin. 
5.1 Volume and structure of the Argen-
tine software market 
In 1999 around US $ 15 billion was spent in Ar-
gentina for products and services in the field of 
information and communications technology. Over 
70 % of this went to telecommunications (some 
US $ 11 billion),63 a field whose dynamics prof-
ited from a partial liberalization of the market. 
Over US $ 3.8 billion went into IT in the narrower 
sense, the area of interest to us here. 
The time series represented in Table 5 show that 
all subsectors of IT have developed positively in 
recent years, though software and services in-
variably showed higher growth rates than hard-
ware. It must be added here that the actual de-
mand for software is distinctly higher than the 
official figures seem to indicate. With packaged 
software for the mass market, the situation is still 
such that only some applications and uses are 
covered by licenses, though recent years have 
experienced increased efforts against software 
piracy. 
Between 1995 and 1999 total expenditures for IT 
in Argentina grew at two-digit annual rates, ac-
counting for a rise in percentage shares of GDP 
from 0.76 % to 1.16 % 1995 and 1998 (see Ta-
ble 6). It should be noted, though, that as early as 
1995 this figure was, on average, roughly 2 % for 
the OECD countries.64  
                                                     
63  See www.cicomra.org.ar. 
64  OECD (1997), p. 13. 
Table 5: Quantitative significance of the IT market in Argentina from 1995 to 1999 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
IT market      
- Overall spending (in m US $)     1.950     2.400     2.900    3.470 3.840 
- Growth rates -- 23.1 % 20.8 % 19.7 % 10.7 % 
GDP      
- (in m US $) 258.032 272.150 292.859 298.131 -- 
- Growth rates (nominal) -- 5.5 % 7.6 % 1.8 % -- 
GDP share of IT market 0.76 % 0.88 % 0.99 % 1.16 % -- 
Source: Authors’ presentation, based on Prince & Cooke (1998) and IHF (1999a) 
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Table 7 shows which sectors generate demand for 
IT. Firms are clearly dominant here over private 
households and the public sector. One surprising 
aspect is the strong position of the large corpora-
tions that were rapidly modernized in the 1990s as 
a consequence of takeovers by foreign interests. In 
view of the problems with access to credit dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, on the other hand, it is supris-
ing that one quarter of the overall demand for IT is 
generated by SMEs. The reason for this is in part 
that from the mid-1990s on world-market prices for 
hardware had declined to such an extent that a 
larger number of SMEs were able to acquire per-
sonal computers and appropriate software in con-
nection with the process of their modernization. 
The distribution of earnings from sales reveals a 
high degree of concentration. In 1999 the 50 largest 
producers accounted for 66 % of overall IT ex-
penditures. Most of these are large international 
corporations like IBM, Microsoft, or Oracle, which 
have sales organizations in Argentina. 
Table 6: Demand for IT products and services, Argentina, 1995 to 1999 
Segment 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Hardware      
- Expenditures (in m US $)  829  995  1.165  1.330  1.382 
- Market share (in  %)  42.5  41.5  40.1  38.3  36.0 
- Growth rates (in  %)  -  20.0  17.1  14.2  12.8 
Software      
- Expenditures (in m US $)  273  340  417  530  614 
- Market share (in  %)  14.0  14.2  14.4  15.3  16.0 
- Growth rates (in  %)  -  24.5  22.6  27.1  18.9 
IT services      
- Expenditures (in m US $)  730  910  1.118  1.370  1.574 
- Market share (in  %)  37.4  37.9  38.6  39.5  41.0 
- Growth rates (in  %) -  24.7  22.9  22.5  14.8 
Other      
- Expenditures (in m US $)  118  155  200  240  270 
- Market share (in  %)  6.1  6.4  6.9  6.9  7 
- Growth rates (in  %)  -  31.4  29.0  20.0  12.5 
All segments      
- Expenditures (in m US $)  1.950  2.400  2.900  3.470  3.840 
- Market share (in  %)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
- Growth rates (in  %)  -  23.1  20.8  19.7  10.7 
Source: Authors' presentation, based on Prince & Cooke (1998) and  http://www.cicomra.org.ar 
Table 7: Distribution of demand for IT in 1998 
Demand types in m US $ in  % 
Business sector, incl.: 2.715 78.2 
  - Large corporations 1.270 36.6 
  - Banks 555 16.0 
 - SMEs 890 25.7 
Public sector 185 5.3 
Households 570 16.4 
Total 3.470 100.0 
Source: Authors' presentation, based on Prince & Cooke (1998). 
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When the present study was conducted, there was 
hardly any reliable information available on Ar-
gentine providers of software and IT services. It 
was estimated for 1995 that some 300 national 
and international companies were producing and 
selling software in Argentina.65 The entry to the 
market of foreign companies crowded out many 
national suppliers. The same period, however, saw 
the startup of a good number of new software 
companies, which indicates that even today a 
number of 300 national software companies con-
stitutes a realistic approximation to reality. Esti-
mates based on the empirical data that went into 
the present study indicate that in 1999 national 
software companies turned over US $ 300 mil-
lion66 and employed some 4500 persons. The 
share of domestic software thus accounts for only 
13.7 % of the overall earnings of the industry. It is 
assumed that the export earnings of Argentine 
software companies do not exceed a figure of 
US $ 25 m. 
                                                     
65  Correa (1996), p. 175. 
The survey, conducted between the middle of 
February and the end of March 2000, covered 58 
companies active in software development in Ar-
gentina. Most of these companies (50) were lo-
cated in Buenos Aires, four were in Córdoba, 
three in Mendoza, and one in the state of Misio-
nes. This geographic distribution is bound up with 
the study's methodological approach and does not 
constitute a representative sample of the industry. 
But Buenos Aires is clearly the center of Argen-
tina's software industry. 
The companies surveyed are for the most part 
relatively new organizations, as shown in Figure 4. 
Thirty of these companies were established in the 
1990s, 22 in the 1980s, and only six in previous 
decades. The companies established prior to 1980 
were for the most part initially active in fields 
outside software development (e.g. business con-
sulting) and only later added IT solutions to their 
line of products and services. 
                                                                                  
66  This figure was calculated multiplying the estimated 
number of national software suppliers (300) by the me-
dian of the earnings of the companies surveyed (US $ 1 m). 
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Seen in terms of sales and employment figures, 
the industry is made up mainly of relatively small 
companies. In the 1999 business year the 45 com-
panies that provided data here varied in annual 
sales between US $ 25 000 and US $ 12 million, 
the median being US $ 1 million. 
5.2 Quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of employment in software companies 
In the past year the software companies surveyed 
provided regular employment to a total of 1614 
persons. The companies interviewed employed an 
additional 248 persons on a part-time or temporary 
basis. It is important to note here that the produc-
tion and use of software involves a number of addi-
tional services, e.g. installation and maintenance of 
programs and training for the personnel of cus-
tomer companies. Since these services are often pro-
vided by external companies, the supplier survey 
did not assess these indirect employment effects. 
The largest company in the sample employed 120 
persons on a regular basis, while the smallest one 
consisted only of the two company founders. The 
distribution of employment across the companies 
surveyed is depicted in Figure 5. The average 
number of persons employed by the companies 
surveyed was 28, the median 15. All of the larger 
companies were located in Buenos Aires. Outside 
the capital we found only one company, in Men-
doza, that employed over 30 persons, while the 
other seven had fewer than 15 employees. 
Twenty-six of the 58 companies interviewed em-
ployed temporary personnel and freelancers. A 
large percentage of the part-time workers are 
computer-science students engaged in practical 
training with these firms or are already planned in 
as part of their regular staff. On the whole, tempo-
rary employment accounted for 13 % of all of the 
employment covered in the sample, though there 
are some smaller companies that employ more 
temporary than regular personnel. 
A number of companies employ no part-time or 
other nonregular staff with an eye to avoiding any 
possible negative impact on quality standards. 
Other companies indicated that they employ stu-
dents because of the relatively low wage costs 
they entail and their experience with the most 
recent object-oriented programming languages 
and tools. In addition, in periods marked by peak 
order volumes or when certain time-limited proj-
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ects are involved, these companies frequently 
employ freelance programmers and temporary 
personnel, often without any regular contractual 
arrangements. 
Roughly half of the jobs in the companies inter-
viewed were in the hands of college or university 
graduates. Sixty-two percent of the latter hold 
degrees in computer sciences or systems engineer-
ing. Among employees without any academic 
training we find a large number of workers who 
have attended three-to-four-year training courses in 
computer science. This shows that this is an ex-
tremely knowledge-intensive sector with a high 
need for scientifically and technically qualified 
workers. A more exact analysis of the results of the 
study indicates that companies marketing packaged 
software are in need of more sales and marketing 
people with economic training, while companies 
that produce customized software for certain 
niches are more in need of software engineers. 
Furthermore, the survey data also contain infor-
mation on the founders of companies in the 
software industry: 74 % of them graduated from 
technical colleges or universities, 19 % of cases 
involved a business partner with training in busi-
ness administration. Some companies that develop 
software for a specific branch of industry or a 
given social sector, e.g. for the chemical industry, 
the winemaking industry, or the health-care sys-
tem, were founded or co-founded by university 
graduates in disciplines relevant to these sectors, 
e.g. chemistry, oenology or medicine. 
Thirty-five of 52 companies reporting indicated 
that their personnel figures had risen between 
1997 and 1999, while eleven companies reported 
no change and only six companies had cut their 
staff in the past three years. These companies also 
indicated that part-time employment had in-
creased with them over the past three years. The 
rise in employment, strong on the whole, goes 
hand in hand with a dynamic period of increasing 
sales and growing clientele. 
The empirical results support the thesis that the 
software sector can give rise to significant em-
ployment effects without demanding large invest-
ments. 
As Figure 6 demonstrates, company labor inten-
sity, determined as a quotient from sales and em-
ployment figures, shows no major deviations be-
tween medium-sized and small companies. Aside 
from two outliers, whose above-average produc-
Figure 6: Ratio of turnover to number of employees 
Source:  Authors' survey 
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tivity can be explained,67 there is a practically 
linear relation between number of workers and 
sales figures. This indicates that there are hardly 
any economies of scale in the Argentine software 
industry. This empirical context also permits us to 
infer that Argentine software companies create 
one new job (at different levels of qualification) 
per increase in sales of roughly US $ 40 000. 
5.3 Products and services offered by 
Argentine software companies 
For purposes of analysis, we broke down the 
products and services offered by the companies 
covered here into five categories. Figure 7 pre-
sents them in schematic form. Over 57 % of these 
                                                     
67  In one case a company that reaches substantial sales 
figures abroad, but with relatively few workers in Argen-
tina; the other case one of the market leaders in pack-
aged software for SMEs with outside sales channels. In 
both cases we necessarily find a far above-average turn-
over per regularly employed national worker. 
companies made the better part of their sales with 
packaged and partially standardized products, and 
only 17.2 % of the companies surveyed devoted 
their activities mainly to individual programming. 
Only two companies of the survey (3.4 %) pro-
duce embedded software. In many cases compa-
nies are active mainly in developing packaged or 
partially standardized software, supplemented by 
individual programming customized for specific 
customer problems. 
The greatest share of the packaged or partially 
standardized software solutions offered by the 
companies interviewed (83 %) is business soft-
ware. Table 8 shows how this segment breaks down 
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5.4 Customer structure of the software 
companies surveyed 
The number of customers per software supplier in 
the 1999 business year ranged between a mini-
mum figure of four and a maximum figure of 
30 000, the median being 60 customers. The 
breadth of a company's customer portfolio does 
not necessarily reflect its success in the market-
place; it is instead a result mainly of the business 
segment in which the company is active. Compa-
nies that offer comprehensive programming ser-
vices for specific problem areas are as a rule 
marked by low customer figures and high order 
volumes. By contrast, packaged software is as a 
rule sold in large volumes at low cost. 
The software industry mainly works "business to 
business", which means that most customers are 
themselves businesses and not private consumers. 
The cases in which software companies work di-
rectly together with private customers concern for 
the most part not software development but provi-
sion of access to the Internet (Internet service pro-
viders, ISP). Our sample included not one single 
company active in the field of so-called edutain-
ment software, though this is a market segment for 
which high growth rates are predicted. 
A large share of the software developed in Argen-
tina is sold in the service sector, in which 43 % of 
overall sales are made. This figure includes 
mainly the retail trade, telecommunications, and 
banks, hotels, and private clinics. Some providers 
also develop software for freelancers such as law-
yers, architects, and insurance representatives. 
Thirty percent of the overall sales of the sample 
were made with manufacturing companies, mainly 
in the petrochemical, automotive, and agricultural 
industries. Finally, the public sector plays a key 
role as a buyer of national software. Fourteen 
companies (24 % of the sample's overall sales) 
mainly work together with publicly owned hospi-
tals and municipal administrations. 
The great majority of software demanders are 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which 
are, for the purpose of the present study, defined 
as companies with fewer than 300 employees. 
Fifty-seven percent of the companies interviewed 
work together exclusively with SMEs, 13 % make 
at least 75 % of their sales with customers in this 
size segment. Then there are the 25 % of software 
companies that work chiefly or exclusively with 
large companies, including agroindustrial corpora-
tions, large banks, or daily newspapers. Table 9 
further breaks down the sales volumes achieved 
with different company sizes. 
Table 8: Business software as per specialization for industries and functions 
 Function specific generic 
Industry specific 12  % 21  % 
Industry generic 16  % 51  % 
Source: Authors’ survey 
Table 9: Customer structure of software companies as per company size (in % sales) 
Percentage of sales Small companies 




(> 300 employees) 
 No. % Cum. % No. % Cum  % No. % Cum. % 
75  % - 100  % 10 20.8 20.8 6 12.5 12.5 12 25.0 25.0 
50  % - 75  % 7 14.6 35.4 9 18.8 31.3 7 14.6 39.6 
25  % - 50  % 5 10.4 45.8 11 22.9 54.2 3 6.3 45.9 
1  % - 25  % 9 18.8 64.6 11 22.9 77.1 7 14.6 60.5 
0  % 17 35.4 100 11 22.9 100 19 39.6 100 
Number of valid responses 48   48   48   
Source: Authors’ survey 































































As regards the spatial distribution of clientele, we 
can note that our software companies make three 
quarters of their sales in the province in which 
they are located and only 20 % in other provinces. 
These narrow geographic ties to customers are not 
surprising for suppliers headquartered in Buenos 
Aires in that this urban conglomeration also con-
tains the largest number of potential customers. 
But the companies outside the capital also mainly 
work together with users in their immediate spa-
tial vicinity. This observation indicates that, de-
spite globalization and the expanded options of-
fered by the Internet to penetrate new markets, 
geographic proximity to customers continues to be 
a highly important factor. 
Fourteen of the companies surveyed (24 %) also 
had customers abroad and exported some of their 
software to MERCOSUR countries (eight compa-
nies, mainly to Uruguay), to other regions of Latin 
America, and, in individual cases, to countries 
outside the subcontinent (four companies). The 
volume of exports is, however, relatively low. 
Only eight companies (14 %) make more than 
10 % of their sales abroad and only two of the 
companies surveyed have made more than half of 
their earnings abroad.  
Figure 8 shows the target countries for the software 
exports of the companies interviewed. The figure 
represents all projects carried out in recent years, 
including small and one-off programming services. 
This again points to the great significance of their 
neighboring countries in their sales figures. 
5.5 Development of software companies 
in the three years prior to the study 
As a means of coming up with propositions on the 
competitive conditions to which Argentine soft- 
Figure 8: Target countries for Argentine software exports 
Source: Authors’ survey 
Table 10: Change of competition – Domestic or foreign suppliers 
Change National products Imported products 
Increase  55,2 % 46,6 % 
No change 25,9 % 15,5 % 
Decrease 8,9 % 5,2 % 
No competition 5,2 % 29,3 % 
No response 5,2 % 3,4 % 
Source: Authors’ survey, based on 58 responding companies 
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ware companies are exposed, they were asked 
about trends in important business indicators in 
the three years prior to the survey. They were 
furthermore asked for an assessment of how the 
national and international competition in their 
specific market segments had developed. Most of 
the companies have very positive growth dynam-
ics, although, according to the information pro-
vided by them, outside competition and internal 
competition are at the same time on the rise. The 
greater part of the companies interviewed indi-
cated that annual sales, number of employees, and 
number of customers had risen in the past three 
years (see Table 10). 
The positive perception of the companies sur-
veyed as regards their own development is sur-
prising in view of the weak development of the 
Argentine economy as a whole in recent years and 
the heightened competitive situation in many 
segments of the software market (see Table 11). 
The companies' self-assessment was, though, in 
line with the results of a study conducted by the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) on the de-
velopment of the software market in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico at the end of the 1990s.68 This 
study notes that on the one hand the market for 
generic Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP-) soft-
ware has grown sharply since 1994/95 and on the 
other hand that competition within the market 
segment has intensified and a gradual saturation 
can be observed. 
                                                     
68  See http://www.idc.com/Data/Latinamerica/Content/ 
LA020900PR.htm. 
As is indicated by the data presented here, half of 
the companies interviewed perceive the competi-
tion with other national software providers as 
having intensified. As far as competition from 
foreign suppliers is concerned, we can distinguish 
two groups of companies in our sample: while for 
some of the companies interviewed the interna-
tional competition has risen substantially, another, 
large part of the companies interviewed are not in 
direct competition with foreign suppliers. A closer 
analysis of the data material suggests the follow-
ing interpretation: 
— Evidently the protection afforded by a "natu-
ral niche," from which Argentine providers of 
business software long benefited thanks to 
national peculiarities, has been penetrated by 
international suppliers, at least in some sub-
segments of the market, intensifying the com-
petitive situation in the Argentine market. 
 
— For companies specialized in a relatively 
narrow, technologically demanding market 
niche or producing customized software in 
need of substantial adaptation to specific cus-
tomer needs, the international competition is 
far less sharp. In these cases degree of spe-
cialization and geographic proximity entail 
competitive advantages for national suppliers 
over existing and potential foreign competitors. 
Table 11: Development of software companies in the past three years 
 Sharp rise Rise Unchanged Decline Sharp decline No response 
Sales 47.4  % 21.1  % 15.8  % 7.0  % 7.0  % 3.5  % 
Employees (regular) 24.6  % 36.8  % 19.3  % 5.3  % 5.3  % 8.8  % 
Employees (temporary) 18.2  % 14.5  % 18.2  % 3.6  % 0.0  % 45.5  % 
No. of customers 35.1  % 38.6  % 15.8  % 8.8  % 0.0  % 1.8  % 
No. of products 29.8  % 35.1  % 33.3  % 0.0  % 0.0  % 1.8  % 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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Box 2: The Software Technology Parks of India 
Soteica – technology- and export-oriented development path  
Soteica is a company that is distinguished from the general trend in the Argentine software industry by its 
dynamic technology- and export-oriented development path. 
The company develops software for the chemical industry as well as for oil refineries. Unlike the greater part 
of Argentine software companies, it offers not only business software but technology-specific integral solu-
tions such as programs designed to simulate chemical processes in real time as well as information systems for 
entire production plants and laboratories.  
With its export share of 60 %, measured in terms of number of customers and its branches in Brazil, Mexico, 
and Venezuela, this small company, which employs 25 persons in Argentina, is the firm with the highest de-
gree of internationalization covered by the study. Aside from its presence in the Latin American Market, this 
niche supplier has also managed to gain a foothold in the US market. For the future the company aims to sell 
its products worldwide. One pillar of its international presence is the strategic alliance it has forged with the 
US company OSI software in the field of information systems. Seen in terms of the low number of persons it 
employs, the company achieves far above-average sales figures.  
As an R&D-intensive company, Soteica seeks cooperation with Argentine universities. It is already cooperat-
ing with the chemistry department of the University of Santa Fé in applications-related fields, and it works 
together with a university's programming team in developing software. 
Synergywave – free software for architects 
As a company, Synergywave / CAD 32 is particularly interesting in that it in 1999 opted for a radical change 
of strategy made possible by the new potentials offered by the Internet.  
When the base of the company's product - a computer-aided design (CAD) program for the field of building 
and architecture - was established in the Argentine market, it was faced with an important foreign competitor. 
The program cost US $ 1000 plus an annual fee of US $ 400. Beginning in 1999, the program was given away 
free of charge together with an architecture journal. Beforehand, however, it had been expanded to include a 
number of options that enabled users to order directly, via the Internet and from various building-materials 
companies, the materials they needed for a given building project. This entailed setting up a website listing the 
most recent offers of different producers and enabling the customer to place direct e-mail orders for the quanti-
ties of materials calculated by the program. The company is now funded via fees paid by the building-materials 
firms for the service of being listed on the website. The offer of the program free of charge has led to a grow-
ing number of users, even abroad, and the interest of foreign companies in this project is on the rise. A Portu-
guese version is already available for the Brazilian market, and the next planned step is to develop the markets 
in Europe and North America, where the company sees its future. 
InterSoft – subsidiary in the US market 
InterSoft was founded in 1983 by three computer-science engineers. In 1998 InterSoft reported record sales of 
US $ 4.5 million and employed a staff of 90. In the past years the company has been engaged in diversifying 
its products and markets. Its most important products include system solutions for personnel administration, 
horizontal solutions used to model business processes, and vertical solutions for hospitals and banks. 
Furthermore, InterSoft has established three new subsidiaries in the past three years. With an eye to developing 
the US market, InterSoft in 1998 founded Fuego Technology, a subsidiary headquartered in the US. While the 
products it offers are marketed under a US label, Fuego Technology's product development continues to be 
centered in Buenos Aires. In pursuing this marketing strategy InterSoft's intention is to get around the poor 
image of Argentine software, which constitutes a real obstacle to exports. Last year the company also founded 
eTopware, which is specialized in developing solutions for e-commerce. 
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6 The role of software in the moderniza-
tion process facing Argentine business 
The empirical study also looked into the role of 
software in the modernization process of Argen-
tine companies active in the auto parts industry, 
the winemaking industry, and the logistics indus-
try. This chapter describes the competitive situa-
tion, the modernization efforts, and the role of 
software in this process. The chapter finally ana-
lyzes why, in a potentially globalized technology, 
there are still close national relationships between 
producers and users. 
The empirical study does not raise a claim to be 
representative in any one of the industries looked 
into. The authors instead selected, with the aid of 
institutions and experts, a number of companies 
assumed to be in the process of modernization and 
in need of a minimum quantity of software. For this 
reason we mainly interviewed relatively successful 
and relatively large SMEs in all three industries. 
6.1 Auto parts industry 
With its sales revenues of over US $ 1.3 billion, 
the auto parts industry has an important place in 
the Argentine economy. It is marked by a triangu-
lar structure in its supply chain, each tip of which 
contains an assembly plant. The second tier is 
occupied by system suppliers, who supply com-
plete brake systems, cable trees, etc. Each of these 
system suppliers has a number of subsystem sup-
pliers, which in turn obtain their intermediate 
products from component suppliers. The suppliers 
of spare parts for the used-car market are a special 
case. They are not integrated into the supply chain 
and instead sell their products directly to whole-
salers or garages and repair shops. 
The number of auto parts suppliers has declined 
sharply in recent years, a process accompanied by 
a growing internationalization of the industry's 
capital. Many companies have closed or relocated 
abroad, in particular in Brazil. In 1998 Argentina's 
auto parts industry consisted of 400 companies. 
Most of these are SMEs operating with national 
capital, on the third of fourth tier of the supplier 
chain, and with fewer than 100 workers. The lim-
ited number of larger, often international suppliers 
for the most part occupy the first or second tier 
and supply the assembly plants directly or indi-
rectly. Both the companies integrated into the 
supply chain and the producers of spare parts are 
under incessant pressure to modernize, and the 
pressure has even increased due to the 1999 Bra-
zilian crisis. 
The empirical study surveyed 13 auto parts sup-
pliers located in Córdoba; their products included 
transmissions, exhaust systems, loudspeakers, or 
heaters. In 1999 these companies reported sales 
revenues between US $ 1.1 million and US $ 550 
million, the median being US $ 8 million. In the 
same year employment varied between 20 and 
1220 workers, the median being 90. Eleven of the 
companies surveyed directly supply the assembly 
plants of the major automakers, i.e. they belong to 
the first tier of the supply chain, while the remain-
ing two companies produce spare parts. Even 
though the greater part of their sales revenues is 
made in the Argentine markets, nine of the com-
panies surveyed also supply international markets. 
Six of these companies are Argentine-owned, 
while seven others operate with a majority share 
of foreign capital. 
The companies surveyed are currently faced with 
growing competition from both national and in-
ternational products (especially from Brazil), 
though they have, in their own estimate, for the 
most part managed to improve their market posi-
tion. It is in particular price competition that has 
intensified, since, thanks to the devaluation of the 
Real in 1999, Brazilian products currently enjoy 
comparative cost advantages. On the other hand, 
quality aspects are of less significance for compe-
tition in that the assembly plants demand consist-
ently high quality of their suppliers. It is therefore 
not surprising that all of the companies inter-
viewed are certified as per ISO 9000. 
The most important supplier response to increased 
competition was, in the eyes of the suppliers, 
technological modernization, followed by inter-
nal restructuring and modified product lines. 
Mergers and cooperative ventures were accorded 
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less significance here. This is not surprising in 
that many of the companies interviewed already 
belong to international consortia. 
In discussing modernization, the companies inter-
viewed particularly emphasized the fields of pro-
duction and quality control. Twelve companies in-
dicated having markedly modernized company 
functions. The companies interviewed have mainly 
modernized the areas procurement, logistics, sales, 
and management. They regarded marketing and 
customer service as less important. This is a re-
flection of the fact that these companies work 
closely and continuously together with a limited 
number of assembly plants. 
Compared with investments in machinery and 
restructuring of internal company processes, soft-
ware plays only a subordinate role in the mod-
ernization of the companies surveyed. This is 
proven by the low budget entries earmarked by 
these companies for software projects. These items 
are for the most part less than US $ 100 000. 
As a rule these companies use international soft-
ware in their production processes; this software 
is usually embedded into their machinery. In the 
fields of administration and management, the in-
ternational corporations prefer international sys-
tems, while the national companies are usually 
interested in national software. 
Companies dominated by foreign capital for the 
most part procure their software in the interna-
tional market. The parent corporations of many 
such companies decide on which software is to be 
used by networking their subsidiaries with their 
own system. Other international corporations have 
an ICT department of their own that develops 
systems to company specifications. One company 
of the sample spun off its ICT department and 
since the software company created in this way 
has a high level of technological competence, it 
offers its services to other (in part international) 
auto parts suppliers as well. Apart from this case, 
linkages between international auto parts suppliers 
and national software suppliers are limited to 
some specific IT services (implementation, main-
tenance) and software modules adapted to national 
laws (e.g. in personnel administration).  
The linkages between national auto parts suppliers 
and the Argentine software industry are signifi-
cantly stronger. The most important barrier to 
even closer relations is the lack of specific solu-
tions on the national market, e.g. systems ade-
quate to the demands of integral management, i.e. 
systems that link production with administration. 
While such systems are available in the interna-
tional market, they are usually beyond the finan-
cial means of Argentine SMEs. A second problem 
reported by various companies is to find software 
for technical applications (design and measuring). 
One consequence of these weaknesses in the na-
tional supply is that many companies have indi-
vidual solutions programmed for themselves, be it 
by their own software departments, be it by exter-
nal persons or companies contracted for specific 
projects. Despite all of the problems noted, two of 
the companies interviewed use standardized or 
partially standardized national systems in all of 
their departments. The most frequently mentioned 
benefit offered by national software is its cost, 
which is low by international comparison. Service 
is also better thanks to supplier proximity. 
The companies surveyed use the Internet mainly 
for communication per email as well as to obtain 
technical information on products and processes. 
During the survey one of the companies was in 
the midst of a project on the use of e-commerce in 
procurement. It is likely that the demand of auto 
parts suppliers for specific services in the field of 
e-commerce will rise in the short to medium term 
since business-to-business relationships between 
assembly plants and suppliers via the Internet are 
gaining significance. Five of the 13 companies 
interviewed had already installed an intranet with 
the assembly plant. 
6.2 Winemaking industry 
With an output of 12.8 million hectoliters and a 
world-market share of 6 % in 1998, Argentina is 
the world's fourth largest wine producer after 
France, Italy, and Spain. In 1998 the industry re-
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ported sales revenues amounting to US $ 2 billion. 
There are roughly 750 vineyards in Argentina, and 
70 % of them are located in the province of Men-
doza. 
Even though Argentina's winemaking industry 
continues to produce mainly for the domestic 
market, for some years now export earnings have 
been on the rise, as has the industry's degree of 
internationalization. Between 1994 and 1999 the 
value of exports more then trebled. In 1999 ex-
ports amounted to some US $ 117 million. The 
main importers are the US, the UK, and Japan. 
The dynamics of exports was set in motion not 
least by foreign investors, who are making inroads 
into foreign markets. Foreign capital is involved 
in eight of the country's twelve largest exporters. 
The framework for the Argentine winemaking 
industry has been marked in recent years by de-
clining mass consumption and rising quality stan-
dards. Both in Argentina and worldwide the con-
sumption of wine, and here chiefly simple table 
wines, has declined sharply. The demand for qual-
ity wines has risen at the same time.  
In Argentina there are two groups of vineyards, 
each of which is forced by different givens to 
approach the new market conditions differently. 
The first group of vineyards can meet the in-
creased demands at home and abroad. These have 
sufficient capital to produce high-grade quality 
wines with well-known labels. The second group 
of vineyards (the majority) lack investment capital 
and therefore continue to produce no-name table 
wines, which are less and less marketable. 
The vineyards in possession of sufficient capital 
have responded in recent years to the higher de-
mands placed on the quality of wines. They have 
modernized technologically, raising the efficiency 
of procurement and warehousing. Software has 
played a secondary role in modernization, as is 
shown by the following results of the empirical 
study. 
The empirical study surveyed 19 vineyards lo-
cated in the vicinity of the town of Mendoza as 
well as in San Rafael de Mendoza. The median of 
sales revenues in 1999 was US $ 8 million. All 
vineyards interviewed produce quality wines, five 
also produce table wine or must. Three of the 
vineyards surveyed are cooperatives. At the end of 
1999 eight of the companies employed fewer than 
50 workers, nine between 50 and 300, and two 
over 300. All of the vineyards interviewed ex-
ported at least small quantities of their wines. 
Their export earnings accounted for an average of 
15 % of their 1999 sales revenues. Fifteen compa-
nies are family-owned or belong to national capi-
tal interests, three are jointly owned by national 
and international capital, and one is owned solely 
by international capital interests. 
The economic situation of the vineyards surveyed 
in the domestic and foreign markets has improved 
over the past five years despite stepped-up com-
petition. The survey indicates that competition in 
the national market has increased sharply as re-
gards both price and quality. Nevertheless, in their 
own perception, the position of the vineyards in-
terviewed has improved. Positive developments in 
the domestic market reflect the altered consump-
tion patterns described above. All of the vineyards 
interviewed have profited from the fact that they 
produce quality wines. Since these wines are also 
in increasing demand abroad, new markets can be 
developed. Wine exports are thus a relatively new 
business area for the majority of the vineyards 
interviewed. 
All of the vineyards interviewed have used tech-
nological modernization to respond to intensified 
competition, and most of them have at the same 
time improved their quality. They have invested in 
particular in plant and equipment, including 
stainless-steel tanks, presses, and other machinery. 
The growing awareness of the significance of the 
ISO 9000ff. quality standard among the vineyards 
interviewed is a sign of their increasing orienta-
tion to the growing demands of their national and 
international clientele for high and reliable qual-
ity. One vineyard is already certified as per ISO 
9000, five were involved in the certification pro-
cess when the survey was conducted, and seven 
regard the certificate as important to their future 
business development. 
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In the technological modernization of these busi-
nesses software plays only a secondary role and 
does not constitute a major cost factor. Even 
though the annual costs for externally produced 
software differ from vineyard to vineyard, repre-
sentatives of the businesses interviewed estimate 
them as "low" or "moderate." Only one company 
was introducing a new software worth more than 
US $ 100 000 when the survey was underway. 
The level of vineyard computerization attained 
thus far differs between administrative and com-
mercial departments on the one hand and produc-
tion on the other. All of the businesses surveyed 
use software for their administrative activities. 
Many vineyards have a sales office in Buenos 
Aires which uses highly advanced software, 
though the latter is often not linked with produc-
tion in Mendoza, some 1000 km away. In one 
case the reason why there was no link between 
administration and production was that the pro-
viders of telecommunications services had not yet 
installed permanent telephone lines. 
Some companies develop their own software in 
special IT-departments, while the majority uses 
generic products offered by domestic suppliers. 
The vineyards interviewed have different assess-
ments of the importance of software. This even 
goes for companies of similar size competing in 
the same segment: two vineyards, producers of 
high-quality and relatively expensive wines with 
highly renowned labels, were asked about this. 
While software played a practically insignificant 
role in one of them, the other had its own ICT 
department with three software engineers. 
In all of the vineyards interviewed in Mendoza 
production is supervised by wine engineers (oeno-
logists). Except for embedded software to monitor 
e.g. the temperature in tanks, little use is made of 
IT here. Among the few specific developments for 
the winemaking business, produced for the most 
part by small companies or individual program-
mers from Mendoza, there is one that is in particu-
larly widespread use among the vineyards inter-
viewed, independently of their size. The primary 
function of this relatively inexpensive system is to 
document the receipt of grapes, in this way facili-
tating the mandatory declaration winegrowers are 
required by law to submit to the Instituto Nacional 
de Vitivinicultura (National Viticulture Institute). 
This packaged software was developed by a small 
software company from Mendoza, that has since 
then gradually added additional features to it.  
Since 1997 the Internet has found its way into the 
vineyards. Eighteen of the businesses interviewed 
had access to the Internet and to email when the 
study was conducted. Seven vineyards had a 
homepage of their own for presentation purposes; 
nine had an internal network of their own. 
In the form of e-commerce, the Internet offers 
vineyards new areas of business activity for the 
future. Nine vineyards are examining the possibil-
ity of using e-commerce as a new sales channel. 
In two cases this is a business-to-business applica-
tion, the international sale of must between vine-
yards and contacts between the producers and 
sellers of quality wines. The possibility of busi-
ness-to-consumer sales is seen especially by 
smaller vineyards as a means of increasing their 
share of direct sales to end customers, which is 
already high. When the survey was underway, one 
group of national entrepreneurs who also own 
three vineyards was just about to open up a virtual 
wineshop. 
The businessmen interviewed see payment by 
credit card as a problem that is yet to be solved. 
One business presents its wines, prices, and sales 
modalities on its homepage. Only when a poten-
tial buyer has transferred the price of his purchase 
to the account indicated is the wine delivered. 
This form of e-commerce gives rise to additional 
transaction costs (e.g. the need to constantly 
monitor email and bank account) that are passed 
on to the end customer. The current fees de-
manded by banks for such transactions imply that 
international e-commerce is unlikely to gain a 
solid footing in the immediate future. 
Wine is well suited as a product for sale via e-
commerce. More use of this new marketing and 
sales channel could engender positive impulses 
for the software industry. A growing use of e-
commerce would also lead to an increase in the 
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use of software in vineyard operations. But as 
long as this stops at homepage design, there will 
be no major impulses for Argentina's software 
industry. If, on the other hand, the issue is e-
commerce, including international financial trans-
actions, the share of technology-intensive services 
would be far higher, and the push effects on the 
domestic IT sector would be more pronounced. 
6.3 Logistics 
Logistics services are a relatively new business 
segment in the Argentine economy. In 1999 the 
industry made sales amounting to US $ 0.6 bil-
lion. Traditionally, the only, or at least the main, 
function of the companies active in this industry 
has been the shipping of freight. The services 
associated with the flow of goods inside a factory, 
including warehousing, materials management, 
and end products have remained the responsibility 
of the producing firm. Due to growing competi-
tion, however, more and more company functions 
were gradually outsourced in the 1990s as a 
means of boosting company efficiency and pro-
ductivity. This development opened up new busi-
ness segments for providers of special services 
and traditional shipping companies. Today, logis-
tics services may include up to six activities:69 
— shipping,  
— warehousing,  
— handling,  
— stock management (raw materials, intermedi-
ate products, end products), 
— production planning, and 
— order-processing. 
The empirical study covers eleven providers of 
logistics services, most of them headquartered in 
Buenos Aires. Almost all of these companies offer 
integral variants of all six components of logistic 
services. Some of these companies are also active 
                                                     
69  Interview with Pablo Doregger, ARLOG, in Buenos 
Aires, on February 22, 2000. 
internationally. The sample includes some of the 
most important companies in the industry, but also 
medium-sized and very small companies. This 
made it possible, despite the limited size of the 
sample, to investigate quite different economic 
units and their strategies in the use of technology. 
In order to offer logistics services, companies 
need not necessarily be in possession of a truck 
fleet or warehouse of their own. Many companies 
contract external carriers for all or part of their 
transports. Half of the companies surveyed had no 
fleet of vehicles at all. It is far less frequent for 
such companies not to have a warehouse of their 
own. This was the case with only two companies 
from the sample. 
Logistics services are increasingly linked with the 
handling of large quantities of information in that 
they 
— integrate and restructure various company 
functions (shipping, warehousing, order-pro-
cessing); 
— are as a rule offered by complex and relatively 
large companies with several warehouses, a 
fleet of vehicles either of their own or leased, 
and a good number of workers; 
— require an exchange of information with at 
least two different economic agents (first, the 
customer, second, the customer's customer); 
and 
— involve dealing with and handling a growing 
diversity of products. 
We can observe two contrary tendencies in the 
market for logistics services: 
— On the one hand, the market has been grow-
ing since the beginning of the 1990s, since an 
increasing number of industrial corporations 
in Argentina now outsource not only shipping 
but a number of other functions of the logis-
tics chain (warehousing, order-processing). 
Furthermore, due to the liberalization of for-
eign trade and the sharply increasing imports 
of consumer goods it entails, the market has 
grown. Deregulation of postal services has 
38 Andreas Stamm 
 
opened up an important field of business for 
private providers. 
— On the other hand, competition inside the 
industry has increased because new suppliers, 
including some big international corporations, 
have entered the Argentine market. In addi-
tion, some transnational corporations from 
other industries (food, automobiles) have be-
gun operations in Argentina and have logis-
tics department of their own or work together 
with Argentine subsidiaries. 
The empirical study shows that the second of the 
tendencies named is predominant, i.e. the supply 
of logistics services is growing faster than the 
demand for them. Even though the majority of the 
companies interviewed indicated that their market 
position has not changed, or indeed has improved, 
in the past five years, there were complaints about 
the declining prices for services. The quality of 
the service offered (predictable, on time) is not all 
that important since this is a relatively new ser-
vice, and most customers lack experience with it. 
It is only the quality demands of international 
customers that are seen as very high. 
When the study was conducted, only one such 
company had been certified as per ISO 9002. This 
is a company that has close links to the automo-
bile sector and mainly works for a limited number 
of large assembly plants. Three other companies 
were in the process of being certified. 
The majority of the companies interviewed regard 
technological modernization as the measure best 
suited to responding to the growing competition in 
the industry. The few cases in which this is not 
seen as strategically relevant are very new com-
panies or companies that have only recently be-
come active in Argentina and are already using 
up-to-date technologies. 
Technological modernization varies in type from 
company to company: while some of the compa-
nies surveyed were making low but constant im-
provements, two others indicated that they had in 
recent years made substantial investments in new 
high-tech warehouses. In general, warehousing 
and stock management were seen as the functions 
most affected by technological modernization. 
All of the logistics companies interviewed use 
software in all of their functions. This reflects the 
large quantities of data handled in this industry 
and shows that all company processes can and 
must be optimized on the basis of software as a 
means of encountering the growing pressure gen-
erated by price. 
We can summarize our findings on the use of 
software in logistics companies as follows: 
— All of the large companies interviewed and 
nearly all of the companies in the sample 
have IT-departments of their own.70 
— As far as functions are concerned that have 
been especially modernized in recent years, 
including e.g. warehousing and stock man-
agement, the companies interviewed tend to 
place their trust in in-house developments 
and/or international programs. 
— Software provided by Argentine suppliers is 
mainly used in accounting, payroll and hu-
man resources, and some special applications 
(e.g. route optimization). 
The linkages between the supply of domestic 
software and the demand of logistics companies 
are limited mainly by a lack on the supply side. 
Several of the companies surveyed stated that they 
are unable to find any solutions in the national 
market for their core business activity (warehous-
ing). The relevant modules of generic ERP-pro-
grams are, in the opinion expressed by the com-
panies interviewed, subcomplex. But at the same 
time the international systems are too expensive 
for Argentine logistics companies in that they do 
not pay for itself in the narrow market. Thanks to 
these supply restrictions, the companies inter-
viewed are forced to look to international solu-
tions and to combine these with other software 
modules either bought in the market or developed 
for the purpose. 
                                                     
70  In one case employing 20 persons. 
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One example for the lacking linkage between 
national supply and demand is a logistics com-
pany in the sample, an Argentine subsidiary of a 
transnational corporation that mainly works for a 
French automaker. This company sees for itself a 
comparative advantage in using software com-
patible with that used by its most important cus-
tomer. This is a strong argument against the use of 
national software. A stronger linkage between 
national supply and demand is in this case pre-
vented by another factor: if every subsidiary of a 
transnational corporation worked with local soft-
ware, the costs for the corporation would rise 
since every update of a specific software item 
would require a reprogramming of the interfaces 
in question. In the case under review the parent 
company not only bans the use of local software, 
it is also gradually replacing the Argentine pro-
grams used thus far (administration and manage-
ment) with an integrated ERP system supplied by 
SAP, which the automaker uses in the parent 
plant. 
6.4 User-producer interaction in the 
Argentine software industry 
The survey showed that it is mainly in the field of 
ERP-software for SMEs that there are close link-
ages between national suppliers and demanders. 
The following section analyzes what reasons there 
are for Argentine companies to avail themselves 
of the national supply and why suppliers have thus 
far concentrated largely on the Argentine market. 
The section also looks into the factors that limit or 
prevent local user-producer interactions. 
Incentives for the use of national software 
For many Argentine SMEs price is the most im-
portant argument influencing the decision on what 
systems to purchase. This is linked on the one 
hand with financial constraints and on the other 
with a lack of information on the possible utility 
to be derived from different software. The na-
tional supply, with its relatively low and gradu-
ated prices, adjusts to SMEs of different sizes. 
The prices for local services like software imple-
mentation, maintenance, and updates are also 
lower than those of the large international suppli-
ers. The reason for this is, first, the distinctly 
lower wages commanded by skilled labor in the 
domestic labor market and, second, geographic 
proximity, which means shorter travel times and 
lower travel costs.  
For Argentine demanders, Argentine software 
offers four advantages: 
— The national systems are attuned to the na-
tional legal system (accounting) as well as na-
tional business practices (e.g. modes of pay-
ment). National suppliers guarantee quick ad-
justments to frequent changes in laws, in this 
way ensuring that their software is always 
functional. 
— Geographic proximity and close relations 
between supplier and user permit a flexible 
technical service, in particular when the sup-
port is needed on the customer's premises. 
— The variety of different management pro-
grams available make it possible for SMEs to 
select their systems in terms of their specific 
level of complexity and process computeriza-
tion. 
— Only for few branches of industry there are 
industry-specific systems available. Where 
this is not the case, the companies concerned 
are forced to have their own software depart-
ments program individual systems or have 
external (local) programmers work out cus-
tomized solutions for them. 
Obstacles to the use of national software 
Companies dominated by foreign capital as a rule 
use little Argentine software. International corpo-
rations are interested in unifying their various 
national subsidiaries. They in this way elude the 
pitfalls of incompatible systems, which entail high 
costs for updating interfaces. Something similar 
can be observed in companies that work closely 
together with international customers. Suppliers 
tend to start using the systems employed by their 
major customers. They in this way comply with 
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customer demands or see system compatibility as 
one of their comparative advantages. 
National software has less of a reputation than inter-
national programs. Accordingly, domestic deman-
ders see the use of world-standard software as a 
strategic advantage in linking up with international 
markets. Furthermore, many demanders are sceptical 
about the survival chances of smaller national sup-
pliers and for that reason put their money on the 
services offered by big international providers. 
Moments of "inertia" in the software mar-
ket 
— Once a piece of software, of national or inter-
national origin, has been installed in a com-
pany, the user tends to avoid changing pro-
viders in order not to lose his "sunk costs". 
The latter are especially high when the sys-
tems concerned have been individually pro-
grammed or call for costly implementation or 
staff schooling. 
— User information on the supply of software 
available is as a rule incomplete. Decisions 
on the use of software are often made on the 
basis of personal contacts, seldom on the ba-
sis of a cost-benefit analysis of all systems 
available. 
We explained earlier that there are a number of 
incentives for domestic SMEs to acquire their 
software locally and not from international suppli-
ers. Conversely, however, this does not explain 
why it is that Argentine software suppliers sell 
their products and services almost exclusively in 
the national market and have not made a mark in 
the international market. Based on interviews with 
suppliers, we have drawn up an ideal-typical 
model of the development of software companies 
in Argentina; its aim is to explain the limited 
scopes of action open to them thus far (see Box 3). 
This path dependency of companies entails an 
accumulation of comparative advantages in con-
nection with interaction with customers of a spe-
cific type. Departure from the path once embarked 
upon to develop new markets and offer new prod-
ucts implies the eventuality of greater risks and 
need for greater investments. Even today the ma-
jority of Argentine software companies are un-
willing to depart from the path once taken, the 
macroeconomic signals and the institutional envi-
ronment providing neither adequate incentives to 
do so nor the framework required. 
7 Analysis and assessment of the 
empirical results and conclusions 
The Argentine industry's development perspec-
tives are influenced by factors on the one hand 
associated with the skills and strategies of the 
Box 3: Ideal-typical development of an Argentine software provider 
1. Phase 1: Individual programming 
Many software companies have started out by offering individual programming services for isolated cus-
tomers. In some cases these are customers with whom these companies were previously in contact (e.g. in 
connection with business consulting activities). 
2. Phase 2: Repeating and enlarging the scope of individual programming services 
A company repeats individual programming jobs thanks to recommendations made by its original cus-
tomer. In one or more branches of industry the company gains specific experience with the legal system 
and business practices typical of Argentina. 
3. Phase 3: Increasing the number of employable modules 
The repeated programming of solutions for comparable problems enables a company to reuse certain pro-
gram modules, in this way lowering costs and increasing its number of customers. 
4. Phase 4: Packaged or partially standardized products 
Gradually, a company interconnects a number of reusable modules and develops standardized or partially 
standardized products that can be offered for sale in the market. These are products designed to address the 
problems of a given group of customers. 
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companies concerned and bound up on the other 
with institutional environment. We can here note 
both chances and challenges for future develop-
ment. 
Chapter 7.1 discusses influencing factors at the 
company level. They are mainly due to the present 
strategy of Argentine software suppliers, which 
involved gearing products primarily to the de-
mands of domestic SMEs, in this way moving into 
national market niches. Even though this strategy 
may at first have meant competitive advantages, 
the narrowness of the Argentine market and the 
intensifying competitive situation are at the same 
limiting the future expansion potentials open to 
software companies. The challenge is therefore to 
diversify products and markets. As far as the ins-
titutional and technology-related company envi-
ronment (Chapter 7.2) is concerned, the survey 
data indicate clear-cut deficits that are hampering 
the sector's dynamics. These include above all 
lack of access to adequate financing and the nec-
essary know-how as well as the continuing un-
favorable conditions involved in making reason-
able use of telecommunications. Chapter 7.3, 
based on an analysis of these deficits, draws con-
clusions regarding Argentina's economic and 
technology policy. 
7.1 Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats for the Argentine soft-
ware industry 
Until now the Argentine software industry has 
mainly developed on the basis of close relation-
ships between national software developers and 
users. These close links have given rise to many 
of the strengths of the national software industry. 
At the same time, though, the concentration of 
software developers on the domestic market and, 
above all, on the needs of SMEs constitute an 
obstacle to the development of high-grade, ex-
portable products. 
The domestic market offers Argentine providers 
of software a series of comparative advantages 
over their foreign competition. The prices of 
products and services are graduated in such a way 
that companies with different needs and different 
levels of financial strength are able to procure 
systems here that address their individual prob-
lems. Furthermore, the supply is tailored to spe-
cific features of the Argentine market. This aspect 
is especially important in ERP-software that has to 
take account of, for instance, national tax laws, and 
special modes of payment. Flexibility is called for 
in that the country's tax laws are frequently altered. 
National suppliers are far better able to offer this 
feature than their foreign competitors. 
Another element of "natural protection" is geo-
graphic proximity, which continues to be a great 
advantage for Argentine software providers. 
Though the last few years have seen the rise of 
online customer service, provided in the form of 
call centers and thus no longer dependent on spa-
tial proximity, personal contacts are still essential 
in addressing customer problems where they oc-
cur. Here Argentine suppliers are faster and less 
expensive than their foreign competitors that do 
not maintain a support network of their own in the 
country. The essential strengths of the Argentine 
software industry can thus be summed up as in-
cluding a high degree of adaptation to local needs 
in connection with high qualification levels on the 
part of their workers The study also identified 
some specific weaknesses of the industry. These 
include in particular too little diversification of 
products and services, insufficient marketing, high 
wages, and a lack of spillover effects from FDI. 
The fact that Argentine software companies are 
mainly geared to producing ERP-software has led 
to narrow product lines, mainly in the fields of 
accounting and personnel management. More 
specific applications, designed e.g. for process 
control in the agricultural industry or for manag-
ing large warehouses in the logistics industry, are 
not supplied by these companies.  
Many companies work mainly or exclusively for 
SMEs for which price constitutes the crucial ar-
gument for purchasing a product or service and 
which, thanks to their limited access to funding 
and insufficient knowledge, demand little in terms 
of quality. The lack of a lead market of exacting 
customers runs counter to both supplier-side 
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learning processes and technological improve-
ments, that might lead to international competi-
tiveness. Due to the relatively high wage levels of 
skilled Argentine workers, the software industry 
will be able to penetrate international markets 
only on the basis of high quality and a high degree 
of innovativeness on the part of products and ser-
vices alike.  
The growing competitive pressure also makes 
professional marketing a sine qua non for success-
fully developing and defending markets. This fact 
has been neglected by Argentine companies, and 
at present only a limited number of such compa-
nies have a thought-through marketing strategy of 
their own. The consequence is that many potential 
customers are not adequately informed about the 
national supply of software. 
Thus far there have hardly been any spillover 
effects from major international suppliers to the 
Argentine industry. While the majority of the 
global players are represented in the country, they 
are, with few exceptions, merely represented by 
sales offices; and these give rise to learning ef-
fects only when their products need to be adapted 
to the needs of Argentine demanders and this 
work is done by domestic companies (e.g. imple-
mentation of SAP). Between the suppliers of pro-
gram platform (e.g. Unix, Informix, Windows) 
and local companies that produce applications 
used in this context we can observe cooperation-
based international relations that involve flows of 
technology-relevant knowledge. 
Thus far Siemens is the only international IT pro-
vider that programs software in Argentine on a 
large scale. For 2001 Motorola plans to build a 
software laboratory in the town of Córdoba and 
the Japanese company NEC will settle in the prov-
ince of Buenos Aires.71 In 1999 Siemens Argen-
tina S.A. began establishing some subcontracting 
relationships for high-grade programming ser-
vices, and this may lead to some important spill-
over effects (see Box 4). 
                                                     
71  La Nación, June 26, 2000. 
Box 4: Subcontracting relationships between Siemens Argentina S.A. and Argentine software companies 
Siemens Argentina S.A. is a subsidiary of the German Siemens AG and is headquartered in the province of Buenos 
Aires. In 1998/99 ICT accounted for 50 % of the corporation's sales of US $ 693 million. The company's R&D de-
partment presently employs 156 persons. This means that Siemens operates Argentina's largest software laboratory. 
Ten years ago Siemens Argentina S.A. developed a so-called small digital exchange (SDE). The development work 
associated with this products, which was sold worldwide, accounted in 1997/98 for over 50 % of Siemens S.A.'s 
overall R&D. 
When the SDE became increasingly standardized, Siemens looked for new business segments in the area of comput-
erized solutions for telecommunications. In this context the Argentine subsidy is forced to compete for contacts 
within the Siemens corporation. The company's main competitive disadvantage is its development costs, which are 
high in international terms: the company's costs for a man-year in programming are roughly 100 % above those in 
India. 
In order to be able to reduce development costs and respond more flexibly to smaller contracts, Siemens Argentina 
S.A. in 1999 began building subcontracting relationships with Argentine software developers. The advantages of-
fered by these small companies consisted in their low overhead costs, their lean structure, and their high level of 
motivation in working together with Siemens. Problems do arise when unforeseen peak workloads occur that may 
go beyond the capacities of a small business.  
Two pilot projects have been conducted thus far, and Siemens at present plans to build cooperative relationships 
with eight Argentine companies and two university departments. Siemens' future partners have experience in IT for 
telecommunications. For Siemens this means the ability to utilize specific skills and enter into a facilitated dialogue 
on technical problems. This presents these national companies with the opportunity to participate in worldwide 
contracts in developing telecommunications software as well as to use the learning processes involved to further 
build their own technological competence. 
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Despite a number of weaknesses, the Argentine 
software sector has good chances for the future. 
On the one hand, a growing number of national 
SMEs recognize the importance of IT for their 
modernization processes. It may therefore be as-
sumed that the domestic demand for business 
software will grow in scope. Second, Argentine 
software producers could profit from the new 
technologies and develop new business segments 
(e.g. Internet, ASP, customer-relation manage-
ment, etc.). Furthermore, the expansive growth of 
the world market provides software producers 
with opportunities to build international alliances 
and subcontracting relationships. 
Argentina will be able to make use of these poten-
tial chances only if it eliminates existing weak-
nesses and is not too slow to recognize the impor-
tant risks in the international and national markets. 
Though there are a great number of comparable 
solutions in the world market, competition in Ar-
gentina is at present largely restricted to the na-
tional suppliers. This situation is changing, 
though, since the national market is coming under 
pressure from various quarters: 
— Large international systems (e.g. J.D. Ed-
wards, SAP), nowadays working with nearly 
all larger Argentine companies, are now gear-
ing their activities to the segment made up of 
medium-sized companies. 
— The same period is experiencing the begin-
ning import of foreign products (e.g. from 
Spain) that are using low prices to compete in 
the small-business segment. 
— New technologies are diminishing the advan-
tage offered by geographic proximity of soft-
ware providers to software demanders; what 
is meant here is, for instance, the possibility 
to update software via the Internet or for cus-
tomers to obtain technical support via call 
centers. 
— When national companies are purchased by 
foreign capital, they largely cease to be po-
tential customers of Argentine suppliers, 
since the former are then under pressure to 
use internationally compatible systems. 
Looking at the institutional environment, one of 
the strengths of Argentine industry is the country's 
supply of highly qualified workers. A scarcity of 
skilled labor, already taking on visible shape, 
threatens to be exacerbated by a brain-drain to the 
industrialized countries, where the demand for IT 
specialists is high. The wage increases induced in 
this way will have negative impacts on the indus-
try's competitiveness. Table 12 provides an over-
view of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats with which the Argentine software 
industry is faced. 
7.2 Deficits in the institutional environ-
ment 
With an eye to working out recommendations on 
how the Argentine public sector, possibly in co-
operation with bilateral and multilateral develop-
ment organizations, can maintain and further de-
velop the existing technological competence in 
software, the study group interviewed companies 
on their assessment of the support they receive via 
sectoral policies and institutions. We can sum up 
our findings in the following picture: 
In the past the software industry developed with-
out any external sources of funding. Funding for 
both startup and growth was financed from the 
resources of partners or shareholders or from re-
tained earnings. 
— Most such companies are satisfied with the 
training levels of Argentine software engi-
neers, though rising wages are increasingly 
leading to problems for the industry's SMEs. 
The latter are often unable to pay the wages 
demanded, and they thus have difficulties re-
taining their staff or recruiting new special-
ists. 
— Although the situation has recently shown 
signs of improvement, the high costs for tele-
communications services continue to be 
named as a central obstacle to development. 
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Access to financial resources 
Independently of industry, location and life-cycle 
phase, access to the credit market and to venture 
capital continues to be a general problem with 
which Argentine SMEs are confronted.72 Own 
capital, stemming in particular from retained earn-
ings or funds provided by partners, continues to 
be the main source of funding for SMEs. In addi-
tion, customer payments and bills of exchange 
play an important role in procuring liquidity. But 
these funding options are very limited, a fact 
which makes it impossible for such companies to 
make all of the investments required. The soft-
ware industry, marked as it is by a high percent-
age of small businesses, is strongly affected by 
this problematic. The empirical study shows that 
most of the companies interviewed were in a posi-
tion to finance neither their startup phase nor their 
growth phase with the aid of external capital. In 
92 % of cases startups were funded with funds 
provided by partners or family members. 56 % of 
                                                     
72  Yoguel / Moori-Koenig (1999), p. 69. 
all companies see funding as the most important 
bottleneck in the startup phase. Others in turn 
regard startup funding as no major obstacle in that 
the startup phase of a software company does not 
as a rule call for large investments. The growth 
phase is for the most part financed via retained 
earnings. Due to the strong links between a soft-
ware company's investment options and its current 
earnings situation, resources are often lacking for 
important investments in product innovation, 
marketing, and sales. 
The inadequate access of many software compa-
nies to medium- and long-term loans is due to two 
causes. First, high interest rates on loans, stem-
ming from relatively high bank refinancing costs 
and a high risk premium, mean high payment 
schedules for software companies. Second, small 
and medium-sized software companies are unable 
to provide the tangible security required. Non-
physical assets such as knowledge and established 
clientele are not accepted as security. In some 
cases entrepreneurs have obtained loans as private 
persons, using their personal assets as a mortgage. 
Table 12: Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats with which the Argentine software industry is faced  
Strengths Weaknesses 
Business software adapted to the needs of national 
SMEs. 
Argentina's software supply is underdiversified, there is a lack 
of specific solutions; what is lacking to come up with such 
solutions is the required critical mass of major customers. 
The graduated prices involved are attuned to the finan-
cial strengths of different companies. 
Adaptation to a non-exacting demand impedes learning pro-
cesses and limits competitiveness. 
Geographic proximity is important for customer service. Many companies in the sector lack marketing competence. 
Software adapted to the national legal framework as well 
as to local business practices, quick updates available 
when laws are changed. 
In international terms, wage costs for IT specialists are very high 
in Argentina. 
Qualification levels of Argentine IT specialists are high 
in international terms. 
Thus far FDI has not given rise to any palpable spillover effects. 
Future chances Risks 
There is still room for domestic demand to grow, a 
rising number of SMEs recognize the importance of 
software for modernization processes. 
The domestic market for business software has natural limits. 
The growing demand for software in the international 
market offers Argentine software developers the possi-
bility to export their products and services. 
International suppliers are increasingly competing for the busi-
ness of Argentine SMEs. 
There exists an international trend toward building 
alliances and subcontracting relationships. 
The advantage of geographic proximity is losing its significance 
due to technological developments. 
New technologies create new business segments and 
facilitate access to external markets. 
Takeovers of Argentine companies by foreign capital diminish 
domestic linkages. 
 Brain-drain is reducing the supply of qualified IT specialists. 
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The majority of our companies (54 %) see the 
inadequate supply of credit as an important obsta-
cle to development. Many companies that regard 
access to the credit market as problematic indicate 
that their development would be substantially 
more dynamic if they were able to fund their ac-
tivities via external financial resources. Some 
companies even stated that, due to the lack of 
financial resources, they have been unable to take 
on certain customer orders. 
At the same time, 26 % of the companies inter-
viewed stated that the lack of access to the credit 
market posed no problem for them. Many of these 
companies have never applied for a loan. The low 
level of willingness to take out loans is above all 
due to the risk of indebtedness as well as a lack of 
confidence in the country's economic stability. 
The Argentine market for venture capital so con-
tinues to be underdevelopped in spite of first signs 
of improvement. The most important develop-
ments in the venture-capital market include: 
— the entry to the market of international capital 
funds like Chase Capital Partners and Lat-
Cap; 
— an expansion of the informal capital market 
due to new private investors (business angels); 
— the development by the de la Rúa government 
of new programs designed to promote fund-
ing via equity capital 
Despite these new developments, access to ven-
ture capital continues to be problematic for SMEs 
and thus at the same time for most software com-
panies. There are institutional deficits that present 
additional obstacles to the access of software 
companies to venture capital: 
— The local financial sector has no experience in 
appraising software companies and projects 
and is therefore unable to assess these compa-
nies' potential risks and anticipated earnings. 
— Argentina still lacks a stock exchange at which 
shares of technology-based start-up compa-
nies could be traded. The lack of exit options 
via issues of stock lowers the willingness of 
capital-holders to invest. 
More than 40 % of these companies regarded the 
inadequate access to the venture-capital market as 
a crucial development handicap. We furthermore 
noted that a number of these companies were un-
familiar with the concept of and the benefits asso-
ciated with funding via venture capital. Only one 
of the 58 companies interviewed had financed its 
growth with the aid of a North American venture-
capital fund. 
The Argentine government and international or-
ganizations are attempting to use various instru-
ments to remedy these funding problems encum-
bering SMEs, and in particular technology com-
panies (see 4.3). It should, however, be noted that 
only two of the companies interviewed indicated 
having received any form of public-sector subsi-
dies. 
Access to technological know-how 
The access of Argentine software providers to 
know-how is determined by two factors: first, the 
education and training system that supplies such 
companies with qualified manpower; second, 
universities and other public research institutions 
and the cooperative relations they maintain with 
the private sector. 
As regards the labor supply, the interviews with 
software companies indicate that training quality 
is on the whole satisfactory, though there are more 
and more problems involved in obtaining highly 
qualified IT specialists. There are three reasons 
for this: 
— First, while Argentine universities offer 139 
courses of studies in IT with various major 
fields, only a limited number of these courses 
have sufficiently qualified teaching staff.73 
                                                     
73  Argentina's universities offer 57 courses of study that 
take five years and are concluded with a degree or engi-
neering diploma. Another 82 courses of study take three 
or four years and train technicians and programmers. 
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— Second, a large number of IT students drop 
out without a degree.74 This is attributed to 
inadequate school training in mathematics, for 
which reason a large percentage of students 
fail their intermediate examinations. On the 
other hand, there is great demand for IT stu-
dents in the labor market. The high salaries 
offered in the private sector attract many stu-
dents to take a job before concluding their 
course of studies. 
— Third, the high demand stemming from firms 
leads to a lack of researchers and teaching 
staff at universities, and this in turn makes it 
more difficult to offer sufficient courses of 
study with exacting curricula. The earnings 
possible for IT specialists vary extremely be-
tween universities and the private sector. To 
generate a scientific community in Argentina 
that engages in R&D, imparts exacting cur-
ricula, and trains a greater number of highly 
qualified IT specialists, the country would 
need a critical mass of some 300 IT special-
ists with PhDs.75 At the end of 1999, how-
ever, only 38 IT specialists with PhDs teached 
at Argentine universities. 
In substantive terms, the majority of software 
companies interviewed expressed their satisfac-
tion with the training of the staff they recruit, 
criticizing only in isolated cases a lack of practice-
mindedness or a marked academic orientation on 
the part of their new recruits. At the same time, 
many companies criticized the fact that the low 
number of IT graduates makes it increasingly 
difficult for them to cover their demand for quali-
fied personnel. We can differentiate here in terms 
of company size and company location. Large 
companies that have high sales figures and are 
located in Buenos Aires presently have good 
prospects of recruiting qualified new personnel. 
Difficulties in recruiting qualified manpower are 
reported by smaller companies, in particular those 
                                                     
74  One university interviewed indicated that no more than 
7 % of new student actually go on to get a degree. 
75  This is the assessment of an interviewee from the Uni-
versidad de La Plata, one of Argentina's most renowned 
IT training centers. 
located in the interior of the country. It is these 
companies that are, in view of a growing scarcity 
of specialists, unable to offer attractive working 
conditions and the salaries to go along with them. 
The Internet boom of recent years is exacerbating 
the problem by raising the demand for software 
engineers with knowledge of the newest pro-
gramming languages. This is leading to a pro-
nounced rise of salary levels in this field. It is 
precisely at this qualification level that the lack of 
manpower is evident. Multinational corporations 
and international headhunters recruit the year's 
best IT graduates directly at their universities. 
Argentine SMEs are largely unable to compete 
with the conditions they offer. 
Argentina's universities lack experience in scien-
tific cooperation, in particular at the international 
level. One reason for this is that IT research was 
relatively late to get underway in Argentina.76 
Many universities have recognized the relevance 
of an international orientation and are launching 
cooperative projects with universities abroad. Two 
initiatives will be presented as examples here. 
The University of Buenos Aires (UBA) has built 
up contacts with researchers from other countries 
in connection with its PhD program in computer 
sciences, which is partially funded via the 
FOMEC.77 This program includes joint research 
projects, invitations to foreign guest professors, 
and support for PhD students by universities 
abroad. The National University of La Plata 
(UNLP) is also intensifying its international coop-
erative ventures in applied research; its partners 
include some EU countries. 
The Argentine side has a twofold benefit from 
such cooperative ventures. On the one hand, these 
make it possible to prove specialist training for the 
                                                     
76  It was only in March of 2000 (!) that Conicet, the na-
tional research council, first recognized informatics as an 
independent discipline. 
77  Fondo para el Mejoramiento de la Educación Cientifica, 
a World Bank fund designed to improve the level of sci-
entific training in Argentina.  
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persons involved, especially PhD computer scien-
tists active in research. At the same time this co-
operation is instrumental in transferring knowl-
edge on up-to-date technological standards and 
innovations in IT. The main quantitative restric-
tion on these cooperative ventures is the lack in 
Argentina of enough highly qualified scientists 
and researchers to make up a critical mass. 
Thus far cooperative relationships between na-
tional universities and the private sector are ex-
tremely weakly developed. There are three main 
reasons for this: 
— First, university research is not sufficiently 
geared to the needs of the private sector. 
— Second, many universities are plagued by bu-
reaucratic obstacles and procedural intrans-
parency.  
— Third, thus far the private sector has also been 
somewhat remiss in demanding R&D ser-
vices from the universities.  
Some first initiatives are conserved to more strong-
ly integrate universities and the private sector. 
These efforts include internships, scholarships in-
volving theses written in cooperation with the 
private sector, and attempts to attract teaching staff 
from the private sector. 
Thus far, however, these initiatives have been 
more or less patchy, there is no strategic approach 
to strengthening the cooperative relations between 
universities and the private sector. Hardly any 
cooperative international ventures in R&D that 
include private firms have emerged thus far.  
Telecommunications costs 
One consequence of the privatization of state-
owned companies has been intensified domestic 
competition in the telecommunications market. 
But since regulation was neglected, the outcome 
was a costly private monopoly which meant, ini-
tially, sharp price rises for services previously 
provided by the public sector.78 Toward the end of 
1999, though, work was begun on further deregu-
lation of the telecommunications industry. Subse-
quently the rates for telecommunications services 
have already noticeably declined. The prices for 
long-distance national calls have declined by up to 
56 %, international calls by up to 50 %.79 In 2003 
local calls are also set to be offered by new com-
petitors as well.80  
A high percentage of the companies interviewed 
continued to regard the telecommunications costs 
as too high. These costs represent a burden to 
those companies in particular that also offer after-
sales and consulting services. One company inter-
viewed indicated that its telecommunications 
costs account for 30 % of its sales revenues. In 
individual cases companies also referred to tech-
nical problems with the service caused by insuffi-
cient connections to networks in remote areas or 
inadequate access to broad-band lines, which is 
essential for use of the Internet. 
Additional obstacles stemming from the 
institutional environment 
In the survey the software companies pointed to 
further institutional obstacles that restrict the pos-
sibilities of any dynamic business development.  
As noted above, the Argentine software industry 
is primarily oriented toward the domestic market 
and accordingly neglects exports. On the one 
hand, there are product-specific reasons for this: 
for instance, customized software has to be 
adapted to country needs. While this means a 
"home advantage," or a kind of "natural protec-
tion," in the domestic market, it on the other hand 
constitutes an obstacle to exports. If a program is 
to be exported to a non-Spanish-speaking country, 
this means costs for translation. Deficits in the 
                                                     
78  IMF (1998), pp. 5-6; Pastor / Wise (1999), pp. 487-489. 
79  La Nación, April 21, 2000, p. 2. 
80  Interview with Jorge Fontanals, Secretaria de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (SECYT), Jan. 18, 2000, Berlin. 
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institutional business environment also contribute 
to impeding exports: 
— There are no special programs designed to 
finance export projects. 
— The lack of specific incentives, promotion, and 
consulting services put Argentine companies 
at a disadvantage. Competitors e.g. from 
Chile and Brazil benefit strongly from their 
countries' export-promotion programs. 
— There are bureaucratic problems, e.g. there 
are considerable delays in obtaining refunds 
of the value-added tax. There is a lack of spe-
cial arrangements for the export of services. 
— It is still difficult and expensive to make in-
ternational money transfers. 
— There is a lack of specific information on de-
mand, markets, specific regulations, and qual-
ity standards in other countries. 
— It is difficult both to build contacts with po-
tential sales partners and to advertise abroad. 
Software piracy 
Argentina is marked by a high rate of pirated 
software. Estimates proceed on the assumption 
that 62 % of all programs installed are illegal. 
This figure is far above the world average, which 
was reduced to 32 % in recent years. Pirated cop-
ies caused the software companies active in Ar-
gentina total losses of US $ 123.8 million in 
1998.81 The Chamber of the ICT sector (Cámara 
de Empresas de Software y Servicios Informáti-
cos, CESSI) recently managed to get the intellec-
tual property rights to software recognized in Ar-
gentina. Since then software piracy can be prose-
cuted as fraud and punished by up to six years of 
imprisonment. 
The survey of software companies indicates that 
software piracy is indeed perceived as a problem 
in Argentina. This is true above all in connection 
with the bad reputation the country is earning 
                                                     
81  see www.legalsoftware.org. 
abroad, a factor that could discourage interna-
tional investors from developing software in Ar-
gentina. Despite the evidence, the majority of the 
companies interviewed are not confronted with 
the piracy problem as far their own programs are 
concerned. Only 24 % stated that their software 
had been illegally copied. The reason for this is on 
the one hand that many companies work with 
practically unbreakable security systems and on 
the other hand that the problem is relevant only 
for some suppliers. The programs most prone to 
piracy are packaged programs, not so much soft-
ware that needs extensive adaptations to specific 
customer needs, must be updated on a continuous 
basis, or that calls for a high level of customer 
support. 
7.3 Conclusions for Argentine policy 
We can use the strengths, weaknesses, opportuni-
ties, and risks identified here to derive recommen-
dations for Argentine policy. The underlying as-
sumption is that the aim pursued is to safeguard, 
enlarge, and further develop existing competence, 
firms, and jobs in the field of software develop-
ment. 
Financial system 
The empirical study shows that the Argentine 
financial system does not provide sufficient finan-
cial resources for SMEs in general and for soft-
ware companies in particular. Government can 
encounter this problem by measures in the credit 
and the venture-capital market. 
Two measures could be used to increase the vol-
ume of financial resources in the credit market. 
— First, banks should be encouraged and ad-
viced not to make the loans they grant con-
tingent solely on tangible security and guar-
antees but to seek their point of orientation in 
the anticipated earnings of SMEs (downsiz-
ing). This reorientation should apply both to 
SMEs in general, whose productivity would 
be raised by the credit-financed procurement 
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of hard- and software, and to software com-
panies in particular, whose "securities" rest in 
their intellectual abilities. 
— Second, government guarantees could in-
crease the willingness of banks to include 
software companies in their credit portfolios. 
Political decision-makers have three possible 
fields of action open to them to increase the finan-
cial resources available in the venture-capital 
market. 
— First, it would be essential to further pursue 
the most recent approaches to building a tech-
nology stock exchange modeled, e.g. on the 
US Nasdaq. It would be necessary to set up a 
secondary market, i.e. a stock-market seg-
ment to trade the stock of infant technology 
companies as a means of ensuring the reflux 
of invested capital. 
— Second, the public sector can assume a direct 
role in allocating venture capital. One possi-
bility that should be looked into is allotment 
of funds to venture-capital organizations that 
accompany the startup phase of software 
companies. One particularly important aspect 
of government action would be support for 
seed and startup funding, because in these 
phases private investors are often unwilling to 
take the high risks involved in placing their 
capital at the disposal of newly founded com-
panies. 
— Third, the public sector could use fairs, com-
petitions, and tax breaks as incentives to 
broaden the base of venture capital. Startup 
fairs would be a good way to better familiar-
ize software companies with the benefits and 
possible uses of venture capital. Competitions 
calling on software companies to present their 
business ideas could award the winners 
startup capital as prizes. Tax breaks for in-
vestments in relevant funds could contribute 
to bolstering the supply of venture capital. 
Supply of qualified labor 
In spite of training of good quality, Argentina 
even today lacks the highly qualified, college-
trained IT specialists needed to cover the demand 
of software companies. This bottleneck could be 
aggravated in the future if the national and inter-
national demand for IT specialists grew more 
rapidly than the national supply due to dynamic 
growth of the international software market. If a 
sufficient number of IT specialists are to be avail-
able in Argentine in the future, it will be necessary 
to invest heavily in IT training at public universi-
ties. Three measures could increase both the quan-
tity and the quality of training. 
— First, the number of teaching staff and PhD 
candidates should be increased as a means of 
raising the personnel strength of public univer-
sities and, accordingly, the number of gradu-
ates.  
— Second, in view of the relevance of training 
and knowledge as resources essential to Ar-
gentina's future development, it would be ad-
visable to raise the salaries of teaching staff 
to levels ensuring at least a reasonable living 
standard and making a career in teaching and 
research more attractive to qualified gradu-
ates and PhD.s.  
— Third, scholarship programs could be used to 
make academic training accessible to more 
young people. Socially less well-off popula-
tion groups are at present clearly underrepre-
sented at universities in Argentina. This dis-
parity is at odds with the ideal of equal oppor-
tunity for members of different social strata. 
On the other hand, Argentina's educa-
tion/training system is losing important hu-
man resources. One possibility would be spe-
cific scholarships for IT-relevant disciplines, 
e.g. computer science, electronics, or mathe-
matics. The issue of funding could be ad-
dressed by the public sector as well as via full 
or partial contributions provided by the pri-
vate sector. This might also include interna-
tional software corporations that would at the 
same time benefit from graduates of the Ar-
gentine education/training system.  
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Research and development 
Both the private and the public sector of the Ar-
gentine system of innovation are marked by grave 
deficits, including in particular a low propensity to 
innovate on the part of firms and an inadequate 
public research system.82 Since 1996 Argentina 
has developed or reformed and focused a number 
of modern instruments of technology policy (see 
4.3). These are in principle suited to strengthening 
the country's innovation system, though these 
instruments should be more consistently geared to 
the specific givens encountered in knowledge-
intensive services and would have to be endowed 
with greater financial resources. The public sector 
could become active here in four specific areas: 
— First, it could stimulate R&D in the private 
sector. International experience shows that 
tax incentives and some subsidies can be used 
to increase the willingness of companies to 
engage in R&D as well as to innovate. FON-
TAR's "Crédito Fiscal" could be used to 
stimulate development projects in the IT sec-
tor, indeed it has already done so in individ-
ual cases in connection with three initial 
competitions.  
— Second, government can improve the public 
sector's IT research capacities. This would re-
quire on the one hand increased investment in 
computer-science faculties on the one hand 
and possibly concentration on faculties with a 
comparatively good record. On the other 
hand, the possibility of developing a public 
institute for applications-related IT research 
should be looked into as soon as the human 
resources available are sufficient for the pur-
pose. The starting point here could be the mi-
croelectronics department of the Instituto Na-
cional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI). In 
addition, contracted university research 
should also be facilitated. This could be done 
by setting up university-level R&D institutes. 
                                                     
82  Worldwide, all Latin American countries have poor 
values on innovation-relevant indicators. See Stamm 
(1999). 
— Third, political decision-makers can encour-
age cooperation between public and private 
actors within the national system of innova-
tion. In FONCyT's Programa de Investiga-
ción y Desarrollo, Argentina's technology 
policy is already in possession of a relevant 
instrument. It would, however, be important 
to determine why it has until now been 
mainly outside institutions, and rarely private 
firms, that have contracted for R&D projects 
at universities and research institutes. 
— Fourth, in view of a very underdeveloped 
R&D tradition, the Argentine public sector 
could harness its demand power to induce in-
novative projects. In a manner more targeted 
than in the past, it could identify areas in 
which there is a need for R&D to modernize 
administrations and public services, e.g. in 
the health sector or in traffic-guidance sys-
tems. The R&D projects decided on could be 
advertised through a system of transparent 
and public competitions. The offers received 
could then be reviewed to find the most suit-
able proposals and to publicly fund the R&D 
projects selected. The propensity of public and 
private actors to cooperate can be boosted by 
making such cooperation an element of project 
evaluation in competitions. In the case of com-
plex solutions it would also be possible to seek 
the participation of international partners.  
Promotion of business startups 
Aside from the provision of venture capital to start 
up technology companies (see above), the public 
sector has four further possible approaches to ac-
celerating the rejuvenation of company structures: 
— First, the government could adapt its tax leg-
islation to the needs of infant technology 
companies. It could, for instance, grant one or 
more years of tax exemption for the early 
phase of a company's development. 
— Second, the public sector could initiate start-
up fairs for technology companies that bring 
software companies together with financial 
institutions, business consulting firms, and 
potential customers. 
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— Third, the public sector could participate in 
private startup parks for technology compa-
nies, or indeed initiate them itself. Universi-
ties should be involved in giving concrete 
shape to such startup parks. Startups could be 
facilitated and the survival chances of infant 
technology firms improved by means of rent 
subsidies, provision of technical infrastruc-
ture (e.g. permanent, dedicated lines) and 
consulting services (e.g. assistance in prepar-
ing businesses plans). 
— Fourth, Argentine universities could look into 
possibilities to participate themselves in start-
ups. Stanford University in California is pres-
ently operating a model of this kind. Both 
government and universities would have to 
develop incentive systems that make com-
mitments of this kind financially and/or sci-
entifically rewarding and at the same time 
avoid any moral hazards. 
Internationalization 
One means of supporting the internationalization 
of the software industry would be to give careful 
consideration to five support instruments. Aside 
from the "classical" instruments of export promo-
tion, the software industry's specific features also 
call for new instruments geared to promoting in 
particular linkages with demanding international 
corporations.  
— First, classical instruments could be used to 
enable market-oriented institutions to coordi-
nate and support visits to fairs. 
— Second, the classical means of export-
financing could be used to pave the way for 
larger investments. The latter are necessary to 
develop external markets, to adapt software to 
specific national conditions, and to engage in 
the necessary marketing activities. Specific 
credit lines are needed to make this first step 
into external markets possible for software 
SMEs. Together with the Banco de Inversión y 
Comercio Exterior (BICE) and the Banco de 
la Nación, the Argentine export-promotion 
organization Export Ar is seeking to improve 
the supply of export loans.83  
— Third, one new instrument might be seen in 
the possibility of promoting alliances, joint 
ventures, and subcontracting relationships 
with leading corporations active in the sector. 
In many cases a successful export strategy 
calls for partner companies on the ground as a 
means of tackling the required adjustments to 
the national conditions of the target country 
concerned and to organize marketing. Com-
petitive advantages can also be attained via a 
functionally specialized programming of dif-
ferent modules. Since the transaction costs 
involved in building up international coopera-
tive efforts of this kind are prohibitively ex-
pensive for Argentine software suppliers, in-
stitutional support, e.g. by the chambers of 
trade and commerce, would constitute an ap-
propriate approach to promoting the export 
orientation of software companies. 
— Fourth, it would be possible to create inter-
mediary institutions that are close to the mar-
ket and could explore the chances of exports 
and cooperative ventures in the major mar-
kets. In view of the continuing lack of a suffi-
cient critical mass, such agencies would have 
to mediate generally technology-related co-
operative ventures between companies and 
not only in the field of ICT. The demand for 
these services would, as is shown by interna-
tional experience, have to be subsidized for a 
certain period of time. 
— Fifth, it would be possible to increase the 
willingness of foreign software companies to 
cooperate with local companies if the latter 
were certified as per ISO 9000 or the Capa-
bility Maturity Model (CMM), in this way 
enabling outsiders to clearly assess their qual-
ity standards. Here, too, the possibility of a 
partial subsidization of certification should be 
looked into. 
                                                     
83  La Nación, April 18, 2000, pp. 10f. 
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Promotion of foreign direct investment 
Desirable technological spillover effects from 
foreign direct investors, e.g. in connection with 
the outsourcing of programming jobs by multina-
tional corporations, have thus far been very lim-
ited in the Argentine software industry. The 
greater part of foreign direct investors in Argen-
tina's software industry are pure marketing or-
ganizations. Most of the software sold in the Ar-
gentine market is developed abroad. While the 
Siemens software lab in the province of Buenos 
Aires and Motorola's investment in Córdoba are 
noteworthy, they can not obscure the fact that in 
international terms Argentina offers few loca-
tional advantages (training levels, membership in 
MERCOSUR) and that the country's high cost 
levels constitute a crucial disadvantage for FDI.  
Thus far Argentine policy has not sent out clear-
cut signals indicating that the long-term signifi-
cance of information technology has been recog-
nized and that the country is set to expend more 
effort in seeking its place in the international divi-
sion of labor in the field of software development. 
While the de la Rúa Government set up a subsec-
retariat on the information society, its activity is 
largely restricted to accelerating the pace and wid-
ening the scope of Internet use in Argentina. An 
improved position in the international competition 
for FDI would, however, presuppose that the cor-
porations courted could assume that locational 
conditions will improve in Argentine over the 
long term and that the government is prepared to 
use more and more social inputs geared to foster-
ing competence in this key technology.  
Due to its wage costs, high in international terms, 
Argentina must work to build a manpower base in 
IT that is capable of offering high-grade and crea-
tive programming services if the country is to 
become interesting as a potential location for mul-
tinational corporations. At present Argentina still 
assumes a medium position, bordering on the 
lower end on countries like India, but without yet 
reaching the level of the industrialized countries at 
the upper end. The core of a highly qualified, 
FDI-oriented strategy must consist in a targeted 
increase in specific inputs, i.e. Argentina must 
invest more in training and R&D in the field of 
information technologies. In view of the scarcity 
of public resources this would mean a conflict-
laden reallocation of resources, e.g. within public 
universities. In addition, the telecommunications 
market would have to be consistently further de-
veloped in order to ensure that multinational cor-
porations will find an adequate infrastructure here. 
Support of SME demand for software 
At present only a small percentage of Argentine 
SMEs are using modern technologies and soft-
ware. To promote their modernization entails a 
twofold benefit. On the one hand, it would in-
crease the competitiveness of SMEs, making their 
survival more likely in an atmosphere of growing 
competitiveness; and it would on the other hand 
stimulate the IT market. In view of the market-
mediated orientation of SMEs toward national 
software providers, this would above all mean 
boosting the demand for products produced na-
tionally. Proceeding from existing programs and 
institutions, we can specify three measures that 
could be used to promote the modernization of 
SMEs and the use of IT: 
— First, government could promote the pro-
curement of hardware as a base on which the 
use of software in SMEs could build. The 
subsidized credit lines provided by the Banco 
de la Nación for this purpose as well as the 
"100 000 PCs" program recently launched 
by SETCIP in 2000 point in the right direc-
tion.84 
— Second, financial support could be provided 
for counseling on the use of software pro-
vided by consulting firms. Promotion of this 
sort could, for instance, be carried out in the 
framework of the Sepyme's Programa de Apo-
yo a la Reestructuración Empresarial (PRE). 
It provides a 50 % subsidy for consulting ser-
vices used in connection with company mod-
ernization processes. 
                                                     
84  The program grants private persons and firms PCs and 
access to the Internet at particularly favorable condi-
tions. 
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— Third, efforts could be undertaken to improve 
the transparency of the software market. The 
chambers of commerce could play an impor-
tant role in the task of matching between sup-
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